

On the Fate of the Nation: Party Politics, Resources and Tanzania's Democratic Experience

by

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Abstract

This paper examines Tanzania's democratic future in relation to the politics of identity and resources; and argues that its democratization process remains superficial, and in the name of saving the country's unity, as the incumbent party finds it difficult to relinquish power. Accordingly, it is suggested that investigating issues related to resource management and distribution between the two partners would clear any uncertainties and absolve the incentives making the ruling party, or any potentially winning party to succumb to power.

Introduction

Like the way secrecy and ignorance resulted in peoples' displeasures and brought about revolutions in medieval Europe,¹ immature democracies today are facing the danger of reversal to authoritarianism due to their peoples' lack of knowledge about nationhood and the governing machinery. Exploiting this knowledge gap, incumbent political parties prove unwilling to relinquish power, while for their part, the opposition tends to sensationalize their message to win mass support.² Making things worse, this political contestation discourse is usually masked by religious and elite manipulation, including the media, in which political party leaders and influential persons sway the public to the directions that serve their agenda best.³ This situation, as a consequence, brings no viable solution to the problems other than to polarize the populace and further destabilize the nation. Amidst scant literature on how the existing Tanzania Union structure and resource distribution between Tanganyika and Zanzibar favor the ruling party and weaken the opposition following re-democratization in Tanzania, this essay surveys party politics in relation to the Tanzania Union question after the country's reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s.

The argument revolves around the question “how has the current structure of the Tanzania Union benefited the incumbent party and what would happen if the current Tanzania Union structure is changed?” By ‘structure of the Tanzania Union’ I mean the choice whether to have a clear federal system with independent governments for each member state (Tanganyika and Zanzibar), or any other form of cooperation that is deemed as best serving the interests of the partner countries. It is assumed that choosing a mode of cooperation between countries is determined by the need to bring development to the people, and in particular managing territorial resources or to generally benefit from the system.⁴ Hence, my discussion on the structure of Tanzania Union and the resultant party politics revolves around the idea of access to resources between the partner states in the post-1990s democratization context. Given the current semi-federal (two-government) structure of the Tanzania Union, I argue that the reintroduction of the multiparty system favors the incumbent party *Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)* and motivates it to maintain status quo and to make unpopular decisions concerning the Tanzania Union itself and the country’s democratic path.

The rest of this paper offers background to the Tanzania Union, surveys the Tanzania’s experiences with multiparty democracy and elections since the early 1990s, and lastly speculates on the alternative paths the country could take to strengthen its Tanzania Union by addressing the existing problems. It also looks at party politics in relation to regional and religious appendages, and considers the media influence on framing the problem. Lastly, the paper relates the incentives for electoral misconduct, and concludes with an ambivalent assertion as to what would occur should the Tanzania Union collapse.

Tanzania Union and the Resource Question

The Tanzania case has at least one big concern: the lack of elaborate structure to oversee the affairs (in this regard resource control and distribution) between the two Tanzania Union members. Tanzania’s federation is a complex phenomenon. While Tanganyika only exists within the Tanzania Union and retains no domestic autonomy over its affairs, Zanzibar has some but they are confined only to matters pertaining to its internal welfare.⁵ The Tanzania Union’s legitimacy has been constantly contested since its inception in 1964: For example, there exists no evidence showing that Zanzibar ratified the documents establishing the Tanzania Union; thus rendering the Tanzania Union pact and any changes made thereupon null and void.⁶ This situation has resulted in mutual discontent with both sides Tanganyika and Zanzibar, complaining about not getting the benefits of cooperation as they anticipated. However, there exists the fear that if the Tanzania Union collapses, the separation would not solve any major problems but would more likely create new and intensify the existing ones.⁷ While it may sound as if the majority of Tanzanians reject the Tanzania Union, the opposite is true pending a few economic issues that need to be fixed.⁸

The 1964 Tanzania Union suffered from the foregoing shortcomings, and addressing the flaws in a meaningful fashion would help defuse the existing tensions. Despite the emphasis on its structure and religious issues, little is said on the role that resources play in disuniting the people of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In fact, the discourse on identity politics masks the oil and resources, in general, which has been the major concern throughout the past two decades. I accordingly argue that, while all the other areas of Tanzania Union scholarship are worth investigating and have received enormous attention thus far, the examination of wealth control, its access and distribution in relation with other matters would provide a clearer picture to understand the complexities within the struggling-but-persistent Tanzania Union. Borrowing from recent studies on democratically ailing China and the economically disturbed United States, I suggest that citizenship education meant to address the current needs of communities does in fact cultivate the culture of responsible citizenry.⁹ Educating the public about the foundations of their country could potentially enable a troubled nation to organically rejuvenate.

While most people and politicians in particular tend to view identities – religion and ethnicity – as the main factors for conflicts, they overlook the role of resources in molding and reinforcing identities.¹⁰ However, studies have proved that any nationalist claims attach themselves to territoriality and the need to control resources for the benefit of the people.¹¹ Then, stressing on resource ownership and how people would benefit helps resolve even the most stubborn problems. Scholars working on the Tanzania Union Question hardly touch on resources as a significant factor; they emphasize the Islam-Christian religious dichotomy and the Tanganyika/Zanzibar identities¹² over the economic arrangements and benefits partners reap from the Tanzania Union.¹³ Touching on resources and their impact on the Tanzania Union's survival, Tanzania's first President Julius Nyerere alluded to the resource-politics gap when he stated, "harmonious development" of both member countries would sustain peace within the Tanzania Union.¹⁴ Building on the literature on politics of cooperation, I advance the claim that humans cooperate for mutual benefit;¹⁵ and the absence of benefits attracts public disapproval of the system in place.

Multiparty Democracy, Elections and the Tanzania Union - A Survey

Tanzania's multiparty democracy, unfortunately and openly, relegates Zanzibar as a subsidiary in the country's political activities. With the exception of the Civic United Front (CUF), which maintains a strong base in the Islands, nearly all remaining parties rely heavily on the Mainland. No single party, for example, has its headquarters in Zanzibar. Be it conscious or otherwise, this trend emanates from the peoples' and leaders' mindset on Zanzibar's status within the Tanzania Union; it adversely cultivates a de facto public mindset about Zanzibar's inferior status within the Tanzania Union arrangement.

Consequently, most Mainlanders have become the proximate victims of this analogy because they have developed the behavior of regarding the Mainland as politically and economically more important than Zanzibar. Should this situation continue, an obvious subjugation is underway; it would even undermine the little existing democratic progress achieved so far. In the long run, the nation will no longer be united, but troubled with looming state failure if the displeasures are not well addressed.

Tanzania's opposition has been dissatisfied from the first multiparty elections in 1995 to the last one in 2010. While the strongest opposition presidential candidate in 1995, Augustine Mrema,¹⁶ disputed the results, Wilbrod Slaa¹⁷ followed suit in the 2010 elections accusing *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) of vote rigging. In Zanzibar, things have been worse. All four multi-party elections were heavily disputed by the Civic United Front (CUF) as a party and Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad as its presidential candidate. In the Islands, CCM has continuously been the winner of elections by a small margin. Whether the victory is legitimate or not, curiosity would lead one to question if CCM would surrender power to an opposition party? If not, why so? The trend suggests that CCM will continue to hoard power in both the Tanzania Union and the Zanzibar governments. That strategy would guarantee the two government Tanzania Union structure that Tanzania as a Tanzania Union has been under since its inception and which the ruling party has been promoting. To CCM, releasing any part of the Tanzania Union means "putting the Tanzania Union at risk" because the opposition favors a more elaborate three government system; that of Tanganyika, Zanzibar and the umbrella Tanzania Union government. Moreover, as literature regarding mushrooming democracies suggests, relinquishing power would mark the end of privileges the incumbent party has been enjoying for years.¹⁸

Perhaps replacing CCM with a different party would help end the ruling party's perpetual incumbency; the party rotation argument within political scholarship goes nearly undebated. Changing political parties often helps in creating a responsible government due to the parties' fear of losing in the next elections. More generally, political competition among parties enhances transparency and would result in good governance. The promise is not without dangers though. Recent happenings suggest that even a democratically elected president could deliberately perform worse than a perceived dictator.¹⁹ Malawi's Bakili Muluzi and Zambia's Frederick Chiluba were seriously implicated with unprecedented levels of corruption since their countries' independence in the 1960s. Some leaders even tried to amend constitutions to add another presidential term(s) in the pretext of continuing to serve the public. While it is quite unfair believing that Tanzania's opposition will become worse than the present government upon assuming state power, expecting much from the parties could also cause further damage. Instead, eliminating pressures and conditions, such as the Zanzibar and the Tanzania Union tensions, that induce bad political behavior would overcome these problems in the long run. But with the vocal nature of opposition and the growing levels of political consciousness, at least, let's hope for the better.

In that regard, multiparty politics did not help end perpetual incumbency and party supremacy in Tanzania, but indeed has bolstered it. Currently people with differing party loyalties are likely to be divided than united.²⁰ Moreover, political competition would also negatively motivate the ruling party CCM to do whatever it takes to stay in power. In the name of democracy, however, the country holds presidential and parliamentary elections every five years.²¹ While the numbers of democratic elections a country holds cultivates democratic culture and would eventually promote democracy,²² the honesty of elections and their impact on the populace require a thorough investigation. It is then more likely that in the context of fierce power struggle among political parties, even the current nascent democracy could disappear and structural violence would characterize majority deeds as a consequence.

Party Politics, Regionalism and Religiosity

Divisive as it is, the Tanzania Union at large, and more recently the Zanzibar oil question, carry with them enough support and tend to categorize people into such groups as *Zanzibaris* vs. *Tanganyikans* and *Muslims* vs. *Christians*. Though party affiliations do not count much in such groupings, the division can also be viewed as incumbent party v. opposition. This latter group usually takes an obtuse form whereby the structure of the Tanzania Union is the most discussed affair. An attempt to debunk people's preference regarding structure on Tanzania Union would find that the choice remains intricately tied to managing and distributing resources between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.²³ Arguably, the existing divides are augmented by the increasing flow of information and interpersonal communication as part of political activity. Thus, supporting an ideology depends on the nature of information one has received.

Many parties were formed following Tanzania's return to multiparty politics in 1992. Allegedly, some of the parties were infiltrated by the government to ensure that the ruling party continued staying in power.²⁴ Since then there have been no less than ten registered political parties with fluctuating and varied levels of influence across the nation. Party popularity varies across the country's regions and time, but the incumbent party enjoys a comparative advantage over other parties due to its being the oldest and well-established nearly countrywide.²⁵ Poor communication infrastructure in Tanzania's rural areas denies the country's majority some valuable information about politics and political parties. Surprisingly, two decades after adopting multiparty politics, *party supremacy* – the practice that a ruling party directs and overrides the government as it was the case during single party system – still prevails in contemporary politics in Tanzania.

This lack of political will to let multiparty politics prevail was diagnosed in a countrywide survey seeking peoples' opinions before the multiparty system was reintroduced. Named after its Chairman and the first Chief Justice of Tanzania, the *Nyalali Commission* instituted in 1991 sought public opinion regarding the reintroduction of multiparty democracy and the structure of the Tanzania Union.

The Commission's report showed a huge public disapproval with only 20 percent voting in favor, while 80 percent were against multipartism.²⁶ Despite the reported public disfavor over multipartism, however, the mounting international pressure forced the country to introduce the multiparty system.²⁷ Secondly, it is speculated that most opposition parties were state implants; the nation's secret service allegedly participated in the formation of these parties and infiltrated the real ones to weaken the active political opposition to the benefit of CCM. As a result, the period between 1990s and early 2000s was a time of political chaos within opposition parties characterized by defections and purges, which affected even the highly influential and founders of respective political parties.²⁸

Despite the seemingly chaotic situation, the legal system remained stable and managed to regulate the country's political activities. With the intention to maintain the Tanzania Union's soundness, for example, since then the law requires political parties to maintain a presence in both sides of the Tanzania Union to qualify for registration.²⁹ Moreover, the law stipulates that no party should preach religion, ethnicity or regional belonging as part of their political agenda.³⁰ While the law was intended to be fair and unbiased, there followed a series of complaints against the ruling party's advantage over opposition parties. One most significant complaint was against the requirement obliging parties to seek a District Commissioner's (DC) consent before holding a political rally. Abiding to such requirement would subject the opposition to the dictates of the ruling party since the DC's appointment is influenced by the ruling party circles, and the appointee remains the ruling party's political representative in a district. The provision was declared unconstitutional following Rev. Christopher Mtikila's civil suit against the state in which the High Court of Tanzania ruled in his favor. With many other improvements, Tanzania's legal regime has been steadily evolving in support of democracy and should the situation remain so, we will be optimistic for a better democracy.³¹

In reality, however, the discourse deviates from the foregoing stipulations. Ethnic and religious cleavages exist at fluctuating levels across the nation. Consequently, beliefs are set up or reinforced all anew, with or without malicious intentions. It can be implied from their actions and orientation that most political parties, including CCM itself, take Zanzibar as their subsidiary. Often unconsciously, the parties also practice a politics of regionalism: While CCM exploits its long-term and far-reaching countrywide presence; other political parties have their majority following in areas where their popular leaders originate or maintain a stronghold.³² *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)*, for example, has a majority following in the northern and lake regions, as its pioneer leaders originate from those areas. In the same tradition, CUF, retains massive support in Zanzibar due to the fact that its most popular figure and General Secretary, Seif Shariff Hamad, comes from there and has held numerous political positions in the CCM, including that of Chief Minister before his political persecution in 1985. Interestingly, such political support is mostly unintentional as no political party openly advocates for regional divisions. Moreover, the situation continues to diffuse as time goes by, with political support being associated with political consciousness and economic desperation than regional belonging.

Closely related to regionalism comes religion – which also plays a significant role in the public framing of the Tanzania Union in its different shapes and problems. It is a belief that most Tanzanians are conditioned to perceive their nation as one where peace prevails, and that no religious or ethnic conflicts exist. During one party system, this considerable stability may have existed; but with numerous political parties the situation has now changed significantly. The religious following mostly occurs unintentionally in that the public aligns itself with the religious affiliation of a popular leader; or in that a particular religious congregation indirectly flanks a political party.³³ With concentrated opposition support in the North and in Zanzibar for example, CCM oftentimes and particularly during elections, accuses CHADEMA and CUF of exploiting Christianity and Islam, respectively, in those respective regions.³⁴ Consequently, this framing influences a majority of the country's mass media outlets, both private and public, now that they succumb to the incumbent party by downplaying the role of political opposition.

Apparently, the message the ruling party has been propagating portrays the party as the defender of the Tanzania Union, and the opposition as divisive and detrimental to the country's survival. In the same manner, CCM has also been constantly invoking political conflicts in the neighboring Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi as a product of opposition politics. The accused parties can hardly deny the implied allegations that CCM levels against them, although the evidence is so scant to directly implicate them. On the other hand, the opposition accuses CCM of using some influential religious leaders and institutions to advance its agenda. The latter framing helps opposition parties, in some ways, to win party members and win in parliamentary and other elections. As expected, these debates gain momentum during elections. Unfortunately though, no efforts are made to educate the majority of citizens about how resources determine their democracy and how the parties would deal with the paradox in relation to the Tanzania Union's survival.

Although political parties are required by law not to lean towards any divisive strategies, in reality the practice is different. Nearly all political parties seem to regard Zanzibar as inferior to the Mainland. However, this relegation emanates from the constitutional arrangements that have existed since the Tanzania Union's inception. Until early 1990s, the President of Zanzibar occupied the post of the Tanzania Union's second Vice-President.³⁵ After multiparty politics was reintroduced, his position became literally unknown although he participates in the Tanzania Union cabinet ministers' meetings. Perhaps the regional and religious cleavages that political parties are trying to exploit could largely be unintentional and blamed on the grievances or favor that people could hold for or against the administration and the influence a party or its leader(s) would have on people. Thus, relying too much on identity without relating it to resource distribution politics can mislead the analysis.

Popular Support, Identity and the Media

I have noted that most opposition political parties in Tanzania enjoy a popular following mostly in urban centers while CCM dominates the rural sects of the country's population. The number of opposition members of parliament and local council members from urban areas attest to this. However, due to increasing flow of information and levels of discontent – mainly economic – even the villagers' level of political awareness is growing day by day.³⁶ People's support for a political party, can thus be summarized as rural v. urban; Muslims for CUF v. Christians for other parties; northerners for CHADEMA v. non-northerners for other parties; and most important Zanzibar v. Tanganyika, which is a bit more complex. These demographic divides manifest themselves primarily during election campaigns whereby a majority of followers could identify with a party or a leader. Numerous factors could account for such populist support, but information flow and framing play a key role in the majority's political decisions.

As a factor, media ownership also affects the political engagement amongst Tanzanians. The transition from one party to multi party has been uneasy: it was not until after the year 2006 that the state-owned media became a public broadcaster, despite the fact that even today it relies heavily on the government, and has its chief executive officer appointed by the President. It is even questionable whether the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) is truly public! Under these circumstances, media bias towards the ruling party would be obvious: an anti-opposition approach would also be common. Thus, without outside pressure to express misdeeds, the country's far-reaching broadcaster would find it hard to expose government officials in corrupt practices.

In Zanzibar, mass media is even more controlled. The state runs a radio and a television station, and they all propagate the message favoring the government.³⁷ A couple of newspapers and broadcast media outlets were forbidden to circulate allegedly for publishing false and seditious information. *Majira* newspaper and the Dar es Salaam Television Network, for example, do not circulate or broadcast in Zanzibar since the year 2001, when the CCM-CUF tensions over the 2000 election results became extreme.³⁸ However, other media outlets penetrate the airwaves and could influence the political behavior of the Islanders. Moreover, with the increasing use of the Internet, uncensored information flows amongst the people both in the Mainland and in Zanzibar. The intensity of interpersonal communication as part of a peoples' culture in the entire country makes it even easier for messages to reach the public and raise people's political awareness.

Through media and interpersonal approaches to communication, most people have access to messages about government's misdeeds like embezzlement of public funds, Tanzania Union issues and the like – and they react accordingly through discussion with their fellows and colleagues.

The situation motivates people to air their grievances among themselves at the lower levels and channel them to authorities using different means, including mass media and political rallies. From the era of massive privatization of public enterprises to present times of increased corruption, people's attention to media has increased significantly.³⁹

Incentives for Electoral Misconducts and Recurring Violence

As a result of the divisions within Tanzania's nascent democracy, elections happen to be tenuous and polarizing.⁴⁰ Regional belonging and religious affiliations tend to influence the peoples' voting behavior.⁴¹ The incumbent party wins majority votes largely due to peoples' lack of information about the country's change from single party to multi-party system, as well as the majority's fear for change.⁴² Most of the opposition's victory comes from urban centers where desperate and vulnerable majorities are concentrated and find themselves attracted to the opposition's appeal for change.⁴³ In Zanzibar, voting behavior is determined by the same factors, the only difference being that the people there are more vocal,⁴⁴ and politically more conscious than their Tanganyika counterparts.

The urban political support for opposition parties⁴⁵ also reveals another controversial trend whereby a majority of people would show popular support toward a candidate but not cast their votes on the day of elections. It is allegedly for this reason that in the 1995 elections, for example, a political party *National Convention for Construction and Reform's (NCCR-Mageuzi)* Tanzania Union presidential candidate, Augustine Mrema, lost to CCM's Benjamin Mkapa who became Tanzania's third president between 1995 and 2005. The ruling party would overstretch this factor to guarantee its own victory in an election and say that most of opposition parties' supporters, especially the urban youth, do not cast their ballots during elections. It is an observable fact that urban dwellers often resort to violence or are induced to do so, during elections and other political activities. Aside from this trend, violence could also be man-made and become a weapon for both the ruling party and the opposition to win elections, especially in Zanzibar where political opposition is stronger.

Minor violence can then be said to be part of the electoral process in Tanzania's democracy today. The largest violence witnessed so far is the one which happened in January 2001 following the highly disputed Zanzibar presidential election results in which CUF claimed victory against CCM but the results were allegedly subverted to favor the ruling party. In that tragic incident, the country's police force is accused of shooting at demonstrators and killing twenty-one of them. As a result of this incident, some citizens had to flee the country.⁴⁶ The massive deployment of armed forces into Zanzibar for reasons of maintaining peace during elections, as the state suggests, for instance, has been commonplace and may have compromised impartial voting and increased the potential for violence in the Islands.

On another level, Tanzania's incoherent electoral mechanism can be seen as a more subtle form of structural violence in place to favor the party in power.⁴⁷ Tanzania's National Electoral Commission (NEC), which oversees elections on all levels, has never been changed in structure since it was formed in the 1990s. The Commission is usually chaired by a retired High Court Judge and has its employees directly paid by the government. Nearly all political parties have on numerous occasions complained about the practice that the country's President appoints the commission's boss,⁴⁸ with their major concern being the possibility of the Commission to return favor to the President or his party during elections. Hence, repeated demands for a free electoral commission have been made by both opposition political parties and interest groups.⁴⁹ With this speculated advantage, however, CCM and its government have never agreed with the claim that the structure of the electoral commission could potentially impede its impartiality; the ruling party maintains that the commission is fair and it legally exists.

Although the opposition portrays electoral and other political violence as *bad*, the situation suggests it might not necessarily be so. The chaos benefits some political factions, and can partly be said to be statecraft as a means for the ruling party to maintain status quo. As noted above, the opposition too would do nearly the same as a means to safeguard their power interest. With the growing political awareness, however, changing political party sounds ideal given that the leaders be sober and not engage in public misconduct. Therefore, although it might seem that violence favors the ruling party mostly, opposition parties also benefit from it. That is, all political parties could engage in complicity as some form of violence to achieve their goals.

Interestingly, while CCM would do almost anything to stay in power, the opposition would do everything to challenge the system. To a large extent, this has been true of Zanzibar where political polarizing between CCM and CUF is intense since the 1990s. In the wake of political competition, it is common that every political activity is more likely to divide people than unite them.⁵⁰ Both the opposition and the incumbent party exploit the ongoing divide on issues pertaining to the Tanzania Union. While the ruling party argues that if the Tanzania Union structure is altered there will be no Tanzania Union at all, the opposition capitalizes on peoples' grievances to rise to power. The opposition's agenda at the national level include the Tanzania Union's structure and autonomy of the Tanzania Union's partners. With Zanzibar's current oil prospects, most political parties have recently been sending messages that assume regional belonging: Zanzibar for Zanzibaris and Tanganyika for Tanganyikans. At least two questions remain unanswered: where is Tanganyika? And why is it that the Mainland's minerals are only for the Mainlanders, but Zanzibar's oil is for the Tanzania Union? While the situation seemed calm before the 1990s, re-democratization has ushered in new challenges which make it hard to determine what is to happen next.

A Blurred Future

Tanzania's political future is left to be known. Many problems that should have been solved earlier have now accumulated, and both the incumbent party and the opposition capitalize on them after the return of multiparty democracy in the country. This paradox includes the Tanganyika-Zanzibar divide that the first phase government under Julius Nyerere avoided at all cost for reasons related to the Cold War, especially the fear that Zanzibar would sooner than later become extreme communist.⁵¹ Although evidence exists to support the argument that Tanzania Union was a Western-triggered anti-Communist shield,⁵² it is also fair noting that Nyerere actively participated in forging it. The Tanzania Union idea resonated well with Nyerere's dream of a bottom-up united Africa whereby individual countries would cooperate and later on result in a Tanzania Union of countries across the continent.⁵³ However, it becomes difficult to state clearly of Nyerere's perceived anti-Western tendencies notably with the 1965 constitutional change in Tanzania to ban multiparty politics and later declaring the country a socialist state in 1967. Perhaps it was the heyday of the Cold War and the country had to shield itself from 'lethal' influence, whatever this meant. This protective mechanism included silences about the troubling Tanzania Union affairs, a tendency which continues today when the country embraces multiparty politics.

Amidst differing ideologies as to what form(s) of government would translate into a better Tanzania Union, Tanzanians are left to tell which path they want their nation to take: a more elaborate federal system composed of two parts with equally recognized structural representation, or the existing virtually semi-federalist system in which the political jurisdiction between the two Tanzania Union partners remains unclear. For citizens to make such informed decisions, however, they need to be properly informed. People need to be knowledgeable about the foundations, grievances and the different options to remedy their country's ailing Tanzania Union. This includes managing territorial resources and ensuring reciprocity between the Tanzania Union partners.⁵⁴

The fear of Tanzania Union's collapse if it is structurally modified does in itself divide a majority sect of the population regarding how to solve matters pertaining to the Tanzania Union's survival. This is not to say that the argument has no merit; it is rather to suggest that embracing silence would not salvage the ailing socio-political cohesion that Tanzanians have been enjoying for decades. Empowering the citizens through meaningful discussions about their political identities and resource control seems more promising in both short and the long terms. This majority political participation will promote the democratic progress currently being impeded by tensions like lack of reciprocity between the two partners in the Tanzania Union.

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⁴ Ariel Dinar, Shaikh Mahfuzur Rahman, Donald F. Larson, and Philippe Ambrosi, "Local Actions, Global Impacts: International Cooperation and the CDM," *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4. (2011), 109; Stewart Patrick, "The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 93 Issue 1. (2014), 58-73.

⁵ Julius Nyerere, *Our Leaders and Destiny of Tanzania*, (Zimbabwe: African Publishing Group, 1995), 1-2.

⁶ Issa Shivji, *Legal Foundations of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar*, (Tanzania: Dar es Salaam University Press, 2009).

⁷ Ibid, 1-6.

⁸ Nyerere, *ibid*, 6.

⁹ Stephen Camicia & Juanjuan Zhu "Citizenship Education under Discourses of Nationalism, Globalization, and Cosmopolitanism: Illustrations from China and the United States," *Frontiers of Education in China*, Vol. 6, Issue 4. (2011), 602-619.

¹⁰ Kuanysh Sarsenbayev, "Kazakhstan Petroleum Industry 2008-2010: Trends of Resource Nationalism Policy," *Journal of World Energy Law and Business*, Vol. 4. No. 4 (2011), 369-379. Though the point is widely discussed and argued that even independence struggles were essentially for people to redefine their boundaries and their collective identity, with democratization global forces, however, the people's quest to control their resources has increased and consequently ushered in what is known as "... the new wave of resource nationalism".

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid , xxii.

¹³ Frederick Jjuuko & Godfrey Muriuki (eds.), *Federation within Federation: The Tanzania Union Experience and the East African Integration Process*, (Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 2010), 73.

¹⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Our Leaders and Destiny of Tanzania*, (Zimbabwe: African Publishing Group, 1995), 2.

¹⁵ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation (Revised edition)*, (New York: Basic Books, 2006).

¹⁶ Running on the *National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi)* opposition party, Mrema once Deputy Prime Minister - the title only held by him throughout Tanzania's history – before his defection from NCCR-Mageuzi to forming his own party, was indisputably the most popular of all the opposition presidential aspirants.

¹⁷ Wilbroad Slaa ran for the 2010 Union presidential seat on CHADEMA's ticket.

¹⁸ Duncan Green, *From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World*, (UK: Oxfam, 2008), 88.

¹⁹ Nic Cheeseman, "African Elections as Vehicles for Change," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21 No. 4. (2010), 142

²⁰ Oda Van Craneburgh, *ibid*, 544.

²¹ The failure of elections to deliver the changes that a country's people desire to effect is what Cheeseman (*ibid*) calls "elections without change".

²² Staffan Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, (Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 189.

²³ Compared to its size, economic situation and demographic factors, Zanzibar is said to have received the best of the bargain concerning the Union set-up from the day the Union came into force – and that situation continues to be so until today. See Randal Sadleir, *Tanzania: The Journey to Republic* (UK: Radcliffe Press, 1999), 276; Frederick Jjuuko & Godfrey Muriuki (eds), *ibid.*

²⁴ Mohabe Nyirabu, “The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party,” *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7. No. 2 (2002), 103.

²⁵ Oda Van Craneburgh, *ibid.*, 540.

²⁶ Nyirabu, *ibid.*

²⁷ Aili Mari Tripp, “Donor Assistance and Political Reform in Tanzania,” UNU-WIDER Working Paper No 2012/37 (2012), 3-7.

²⁸ Oda Van Craneburgh, *ibid.*

²⁹ The Political Parties Act [CAP 258], Sections 8-10 of the laws of Tanzania.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General of Tanzania*. Civil Case No. 5 of 1993 (High Court of Tanzania).

³² Juma Mwapachu, *Confronting New Realities: Reflections on Tanzania’s Radical Transformation*, (Tanzania: E & D Publishers, 2005), 209-210.

³³ Recently discussed in Thomas Ndaluka, *Religious Discourse, Social Cohesion and Conflict: Muslim-Christian Relations in Tanzania*, (Zurich, Switzerland & Berlin, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2012).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ This was before the 1992 constitutional amendments to allow for multiparty politics. Immediately thereafter, the post of second vice-president has been abolished. The current system, then, prescribes that if the president comes from one side of the union, the vice-president be from another side.

³⁶ Juma Mwapachu, *ibid*, 2280-230.

³⁷ Martin Sturmer, *The Media History of Tanzania*, (Tanzania: Ndanda Mission Press, 1998), 292-299.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 299-303.

³⁹ Edwin Babeiya, "Electoral Politics and the Politics of Elections Financing in Tanzania," *Journal of Politics and Law* Vol. 4 No. 2 (2011), 96.

⁴⁰ Staffan Lindberg, *ibid*, 57-59.

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁴² Edwin Babeiya, *ibid*, 94-119.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ Greg Cameron, "Zanzibar's Turbulent Transition," *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 26. No. 92, See especially, 322-326.

⁴⁵ John Ishiyama & Krystal Fox, "What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?" *Politics and Policy* Vol. 34. No. 4, 768.

⁴⁶ Surprisingly, though, this information is mostly kept off-the-record and less is known outside Tanzania regarding the first known set of refugees from the ensuing political violence.

⁴⁷ Edwin Baabeya, *ibid*; Greg Cameron, *ibid*.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (US: University of California Press, 1985), 291-332.

⁵¹ Randal Sadleir, *ibid*, 275.

⁵² Amrit Wilson, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Revolutions*, (UK: Pluto Press, 1989), 2; perspective also touched on by Randal Sadleir, *ibid*, 274-277.

⁵³ Julius Nyerere, "Freedom and Unity," *Transitions* Vol. 0 Issue 14 (1964), 40-45.

⁵⁴ Otherwise described by Robert Axelrod, *ibid*, above as *tit-for-tat* and *tat-for-tit*. (See pages 2-6) on how humans cooperate.