

# (Red) Mythology

by

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## Abstract

*This article critically considers some of the representations of Africa that have appeared in and been disseminated through the marketing material for the (Product) Red campaign. It considers various nuances of what it might mean for (Red) to represent Africa and, within a particular examination of the “(Red) Manifesto” and the “Lazarus effect” video, dwells especially on the concepts of death and resurrection, in the way they are depicted in these texts, in the way they stand for the movement of representation, and in the way they make present certain past and present signifiers of Africa. The article is thus concerned with the idea of representation and with certain representations of Africa that appear in Western discourses of Africa, and, while implying that representation is a precondition of truth, and that truth is consequently an impossibility, questions a dialectic view which may consider Western discourses on Africa to have progressed towards more enlightened and “truthful” views. While the aforementioned teleological view implies upliftment both of Africa and of Western depictions and understandings of it, this paper represents this upliftment as relief, which is an easing of distress, but also a standing in for, and a bringing to attention. This substitutive effect perhaps implies that what is brought relief and brought into relief is always a Western representation of Africa, and is thus a perpetual resurrection of Western domination of Africa, as Western views of Africa continue to present themselves as a precondition for the “truth” of Africa.*

*All things being equal, they are not.*

*As first world consumers, we have tremendous power. What we collectively choose to buy, or not to buy, can change the course of life and history on this planet.*

*(RED) is that simple an idea, and that powerful. Now, you have a choice. There are (RED) credit cards, (RED) phones, (RED) shoes, (RED) fashion brands. And no, this does not mean they are all red in color. Although some are.*

*If you buy a (RED) product or sign up for a (RED) service, at no cost to you, a (RED) company will give some of its profits to buy and distribute anti-retroviral medicine to our brothers and sisters dying of AIDS in Africa.*

*We believe that when consumers are offered this choice, and the products that meet their needs, they will choose (RED). And when they choose (RED) over non-(RED), then more brands will choose to become (RED) because it will make good business sense to do so. And more lives will be saved.*

*(RED) is not a charity. It is simply a business model. You buy (RED) stuff, we get the money buy the pills and distribute them. They take the pills, stay alive, and continue to take care of their families and contribute socially and economically in their communities*

*If they don't get the pills, they die. We don't want them to die. We want to give them the pills. And we can. And you can. And it's easy.*

*All you have to do is upgrade your choice.<sup>1</sup>*

There is no introduction; only a state of being, a truth. There is perhaps a sequence of events that leads to this particular manifestation of this truth, to this particular representation of the truth – revealing itself now, here – about poverty, about Africa, but perhaps we shall find that traces of this trail of events may speak quite clearly in this event, in any event: “All things being equal, they are not.” We could begin, again, by commenting on the rhetorical power of this statement, its syllepsistic reinvention of a hackneyed phrase into the form of a paradoxical syllogism we may well feel familiar with, yet one which arrests our attention in the very moment of making the familiar unfamiliar. It shows what we feel we know in a way we feel we do not know – or perhaps the other way around: perhaps we are confronted with what we should know, or knew but had forgotten, or know, but lack the words to express in the form of aphorism, a summary of truth.

This clever reworking of a common expression makes the reality of the unequal distribution of wealth around the globe, as well as a host of other attendant inequalities, apparent to us, drawing it forth from its obfuscation by politicians and corporations and ideologues and everyday life so it may be here, with us – immanent, graspable, able to be printed on a t-shirt, and requiring no further assessment. For, “all things being equal,” the aphorism, having represented truth by re-presenting it, making its truthfulness manifest to us again, lays that truth down as a first principle that must inform and shape all subsequent utterances that relate to it (and perhaps all preceding utterances – those that introduce it – as well). Once we are in the presence of truth there is no escaping it: any inequality we witness or experience will represent this truth, raise it once again to our awareness and conserve its truthfulness. And, all things being equal, we will witness or experience inequality, for the aphorism is true. And perhaps, if the force of this representation is enough, whatever inequality we witness or experience will serve to re-present the inequality experienced by “our brothers and sisters dying of AIDS in Africa.” All things being equal.

But they’re not, as our aphorism reminds us. This is the very problem that (Product) Red tries to address. The extreme and debilitating poverty (if you will forgive the truism) “our brothers and sisters in Africa” face is such that they are denied access to life-saving medication. So this inequality is a matter of life and death: “If they don’t get the pills, they die.” It is also a matter of socio-politics and economy: those who get access to medication can “stay alive, and continue to take care of their families and contribute socially and economically in their communities.” It is also, though this part is not spelled out, a matter of representation: we may notice how this manifesto is addressed by and to “first world consumers;” the “we” and “you” in the text refer to these consumers, while our brothers and sisters in Africa are signified only by “they” (signified only by “they,” unable to represent or be represented by anything else, unlike the “first world” consumers, who are “they” as well as “we” and “you,” are capable of being all pronouns and all perspectives). “They” do not make the plea, though its outcome concerns “them,” is for “them.” “They” do not speak this text, though it speaks “them,” is about them. Of course this is to be expected, is representative of our aphorism as it is an aphorism of representation: all things being equal, only some can have a voice. Others must remain silent, or be spoken for, or about. Sartre was wrong: they cannot “talk on their own.”<sup>2</sup>

It is perhaps then appropriate that (Red) chooses to represent itself in parentheses, to stand within brackets for those who are bracketed off, marginalized, unheard. (Red) calls these brackets an “embrace”<sup>3</sup> and within these markings which represent that which is unimportant, could be ignored and left out, it draws close to your attention and your hearts those (brothers and sisters in Africa) who are too frequently considered unimportant, ignored, and left out. There is then, perhaps, a hope of bringing relief (to your brothers and sisters in Africa) by drawing into relief the problematic truth of inequality (relating to Africa).

Bringing into relief here seems a necessary condition of bringing relief, and the force of (Red)'s rhetoric, and of their marketing campaign in general ("marketing ju-jitsu," as Tamsin Smith, President of (Red) calls it<sup>4</sup>), suggests an approach based on a similar principle. We began by examining the power of some of this rhetoric. And it is worth revising some of what we noted, because it is vital that this rhetoric draw your attention in order for the problems surrounding inequality (in Africa) to be addressed. The rhetoric must negate your received ideas about this problem, your complacent acceptance of what is seen as the fact of poverty (in Africa) and the fact of the powerlessness of everyday, normal people (not in Africa) to do anything about this thing (which is poverty in Africa, which *is* Africa), and uplift your attitudes so you may rethink what you know (about Africa), think again as if the problem (Africa) were new, as if you had never been complacent, all the while conserving the meanings of the problem (Africa) so that it may be sufficiently preserved to be recognizable as a problem (Africa) – as the same problem (Africa) – only now one which is slightly different in that it can be solved.

And so a familiar expression is recast, in a sufficiently unfamiliar and witty way to make you pause, perhaps, at least to appreciate the cleverness, and in a sufficiently brief and simplistic way to let the familiarity of the expression act as a testimonial and provide the new, yet old, phrase with the force of syllogism. And so the frequent use of short, simple sentences suggests the simplicity of the problem – a problem you do not have to learn anything, or anything new, about, since you are already familiar with its intrinsic truthfulness – and the simplicity of the solution, which presents itself as only a slight rethinking, a slight rephrasing, of terms you already know all too well. And what requires, perhaps (and though this is the crux of the matter, the problem represented most truthfully, it is for now bracketed, confined in an embrace that signifies marginality, but one which hopefully can be pried open to signify something else, which we might call for now itself), a more radical rethinking – the hint that this problem is not a result of the complacency of Africans, or their willfulness, stubbornness, laziness, corruption or incompetence: is something that happens *to* them – is presented as casual observation rather than argument, and given weight not by argument, but by its accordance with the values of the "first world" consumers that are being addressed (healthy Africans will, naturally, for who would imagine otherwise, "take care of their families and contribute socially and economically in their communities"); what may (sadly, violently, and all too frequently) be a familiar view of Africans (as somehow inferior and in some sense deserving of their poverty) is negated by an unfamiliar view which is still familiar enough to be recognized: familiar because it represents Africans as *humans* – that is as possessing the middle class values that frequently in the "first world" are regarded as being intrinsic to being human.

Elsewhere,<sup>5</sup> we are presented with the face of an emaciated woman. The image – her image – represents the experience of suffering, makes present poverty and AIDS in Africa, not signifying it in words, but embodying it in the immediate experience of a single individual.

Here (Red) is not only representing and speaking for Africa, but also representing and speaking for Silvia (a caption tells us her name), allowing her presence to be made permanent and always manifest – in all that it displays about her suffering and the suffering of those like her – in the form of a chemical or digital duplication of the image of her physical being (a photograph or video), so that the laid-downness of her truth may be duplicated and replayed, forever to re-present Africa. Her story of illness and immanent death *is* the look of despair on her face, *is* her very body in all its gauntness. This is not merely a representation of Africa, but is Africa, and Silvia's story extends beyond her own experience to that of the child she carries on her back – hardly more than a blurry smudge, its representation signifies its future: uncertain, anonymous, utterly without promise. The child, the smudge, soon to be orphaned, stands for Africa as much as Silvia does: Silvia, the present of Africa, the presence of Africa, wasted and wasting, the child, Africa's future, nothing to inherit but the despair of a previous generation.

The image extends beyond Silvia's experience, and that of her child: Nigel is shown lying on a bed, the protruding ribs on his shirtless upper torso testifying to his wasting away. His skeletal body and lethargic posture are so suggestive of a dead body, that there is little in the picture to imply he is even alive, other, perhaps, than the expression of pain and pleading on his face. This is the image of the promise of death, promised so assuredly on this bed in this small room with no visible doors and no windows, with no hint of a possible escape from the tomb, that it is also the image of death. Only a blurry hand on one side of the photo hints at anything beyond the tiny arena of Nigel's passing, yet the position of this hand – disembodied and thus offering no human comfort – towards the right of the picture only serves to close off the frame, contributing to the sense of claustrophobia created by the image of Nigel – of Africa – being cut off from the world by his illness, interred already, if not by physical death then by the guarantee of its immanent arrival.

And Elimas, similarly skeletal, stares at the image of his body's slow passing in a mirror, as we in turn look at the representation of the representation. And there is nothing illusory about the image outside the body, as there is nothing illusory about its reflection in the form of the photograph. What is shown outside the mirror – the stark bleakness of the empty room that appears to surround, and contain, Elimas – reinforces the stark bleakness of what is shown within it. Reality and image are one; Elimas's physical body, trapped in his room and his disease, reflects the reflection of his body, confined in the frame of the mirror, which reflects again his physical body. His identity is the *he* in the mirror, tied to the reflection where his name appears, and tied to the reflection in the photograph through which he speaks, without words, the fullness of the being to which his name is tied. And the fullness of that being is death, the fragmentation of being, seen through the violence that disease and poverty have done to his body and through the division in the photograph between his upper body and legs, displayed in the mirror, and the disembodied foot that appears outside it. He is disjointed, and in Elimas's image there is no reference to a world outside this death – only a repetition of it.

The original message is reiterated, reinforced. All things are not equal, as these photographs re-present, make true once more. All that has been forgotten due to the Alzheimer's of complacency is now recalled, and the problem made new as Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas, and Africa, speak for themselves after all. They speak for themselves through these images of despair, but also through the images displayed after each of the pictures I have discussed, "after" photographs that show the brightness and hope in these three individuals' lives after they have received medication. Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas (and Africa) are lifted from their desolation: each of them now appears in bright color, rather than black and white; a smiling Silvia holds the child – now foregrounded and in clear focus – her one hand touching his or her face in a gesture of intimacy and connection that speaks of the preservation of family and community through the preservation of Silvia's life; Nigel, also smiling, is now surrounded by people, and stands tall next to a woman, warmly pressed against him, to show his physical and spiritual recovery; Elimas's closed smile may not be as big as Silvia or Nigel's, but it is still in sharp contrast to his devastated expression in the previous picture, and he is also with another person – outside in the sun, the lighting seems to suggest – and there is what appears to be a window behind him.

The window, the sun, the people, the family, the color, the smiles, all represent what (Red) calls "The Lazarus effect," the recalling to life of these individuals equivalent to Christ's resurrection of Lazarus in the Book of John in the Christian Bible. It is a response to the syllogism, "All things being equal, they are not," and its solution: all things being equal, a dead man should remain dead; all things being equal, impoverished HIV-positive Africans should die of AIDS; all things being equal, Africa, the victim of inequality, should remain the interred<sup>6</sup> representation of inequality. (Red)'s representations of inequality, of AIDS in Africa, and of Africa – as I have noted – seem to re-present these problems, these syllogisms, these truths, giving new life to meanings that always already, without introduction, have been dead – closed, trapped, laid down, and without any promise of change.

But, as you may already have begun to note, without any introduction, always already this resurrection is not without its ambiguities. In the images that demonstrate the Lazarus effect, Silvia and her child, Nigel, and Elimas are brightly colored, the world around them left black and white.<sup>7</sup> This may serve as a reminder of an AIDS crisis that has not been fixed, a bleak environment of yet more sufferers that have not yet been named and have not yet been treated, and therefore serve as a subtle call for the ongoing treatment of a continent in crisis. Yet it may also be a symptom of another disease that afflicts Africa: a disease of representation – a disease which (Red)'s representations constantly resurrects, recalls to memory, presents again as syllogism and truth. While Silvia and her child, Nigel, and Elimas are offered the promise of new life through the life-saving medication provided for them through funds raised by (Red), their images give new life to views of Africa that are centuries old, and, by resurrecting them, inter them.

The images of Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas, *without being untruthful*, recall images such as those in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* of "Black shapes...in all the attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair" who had "withdrawn to die", who are "dying slowly," "black shadows of disease and starvation," "moribund shapes" as thin "as air," "phantom[s]" that are all "black bones" and "acute angles."<sup>8</sup> It may be argued that Conrad's images even have a similar purpose to the (Red) images, to espouse "humane views" and leave the audience or reader "deeply shocked" by the "atrocities"<sup>9</sup> she is made to witness; the "liberal tradition" in which Conrad was writing<sup>10</sup> may indeed be attempting, like the (liberal) humanitarian tradition that (Red) is a part of, to challenge and even re-create representations of Africa as other to Europe or the "first world," and therefore to be reviled (recall here my earlier mention of persisting representations of Africans as, for example, lazy, corrupt, incompetent, as opposite to the ways in which the "first world" views itself as productive, incorruptible, competent). Indeed, an earlier liberal discourse, that of the abolitionist movement, similarly used images of Africans as "suffering" and "degraded," making them "naked objects of pity"<sup>11</sup> in order to change the mentality held by Westerners that allowed them to view Africans as chattels.

And though these liberal humane discourses also contained images like Josiah Wedgwood's depiction of an enslaved Black man with the caption "Am I not a man and a brother?" even images such as these, which call for a radical re-evaluation of views about race by acknowledging the enslaved as kin rather than claiming them as property, preserve through their patronizing attitudes a view of Africans as different, and inferior, to Europeans. In this particular picture the Black man, though muscular and thus physically quite dissimilar to Conrad's (and (Red)'s) skeletal figures, is in chains, kneeling, and has his hands clasped together and raised in front of his raised head in a pathetic pleading gesture to his White "brother" whom he is looking up to. The sentiment is reminiscent of the comment made by Albert Schweitzer, the great humanitarian who himself raised countless Lazaruses: "The African is indeed my brother but my little brother"<sup>12</sup>.

The sentiment is also reminiscent of the (Red) manifesto's reference to "our African brothers and sisters," in that while the attempt to re-present Africa, to present it anew in a different way, is certainly present in the appeal to kinship, this appeal is itself patronizing when taken in the context of the manifesto's speaking for Africa, of its distinction between "we" and "you" on the one hand and "they" on the other, in its marking of the differences between a "first world" experience of "credit cards," "phones," "shoes," of buying, acquisition and consumption, and the African experience (apparently the only African experience) of pills and dying and desperation, in its appeal to save Africa from disease and poverty – admirable and desirable though this appeal may be – because Africa, the subaltern, is disease and poverty, must always be disease and poverty, because it is the dark reflection of the "first world" – which has the "tremendous power" of life and death over it – because it is its other. (Red) represents what the "first world" knows in the form it has always known it – as syllogism, as truth.

And so the rebirth image in the “Lazarus effect” video is evocative not only of the Biblical tale of a dead man being brought back to life, but also of another resurrection story: *Frankenstein*.<sup>13</sup> For when the recalling to life of Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas is represented, something else is raised with them: the familiar is made familiar again; those truths the “first world” thought it knew about Africa are again shown to be true; the “first world” is shown what it feels it knows in the same representations it has been shown before, again and again, with each representation acting as proof for the syllogism, the summary truth, which, always already interred, cannot be killed and remain dead, cannot be buried. Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas are resurrected, but for being resurrected they must bear the repulsed gaze of their savior, a gaze that can only see them as “miserable monster[s]”.<sup>14</sup> Depicted as gaunt, skeletal shadows, the living dead in their tomb, which is Africa (which is poverty, which is disease, which is death), they are depicted as “creatures” to be pitied by the “first world,” assuring it of its own health, its own power, its own superiority (consider that Lazarus is not the subject of his tale; he has no agency, and his function in the story is to demonstrate the greatness of Christ); and even the “after” portrayals of the patients in their restored state reinforce – re-present – their sense of otherness.

The greater similarity they bear to their gazers within the context of these representations only serves to highlight their difference from them. The photos still contain signifiers of difference – the backgrounds in these photos which imply continued poverty, the use of black and white for these backgrounds to contrast with the recovered patients, and to imply an unrecovered, dead environment around them. Furthermore, the traces of the signifiers of difference represented in the images of their dying have not been erased: in order for the second in each set of photos to have an impact, a meaning, to signify resurrection, it needs to be compared and contrasted with the first; and the first must not be negated, forgotten, buried, but must be conserved, re-remembered – put back together again and given life once more – and therefore interred. And this interred meaning is one that must cause the “first world”, the gazer, the subject, revulsion, as, in the images of them, Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas fail to be like the subject, fail to be “normal,” “European<sup>15</sup>,” human. The object of the gaze is turned into “an other, in relation to whom the [gazing] subject is transcendent<sup>16</sup>,” and the object’s failure to transcend (be human, not African) and become subject is a simultaneous reminder of the subject’s own success – and thus superiority – and of the possibility of failure, the impossibility of subjecthood.

(Red)’s representations may therefore be said to objectify Africa and Africans, turning Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas – even as they speak for themselves as subjects of their difficult experiences – into the objects of their gazers’ pity and revulsion, spoken for and about. This is not to say that (Red)’s humanitarian effort is intrinsically and necessarily objectifying – this is the topic for a further investigation.<sup>17</sup> It is to say that (Red)’s representations of this humanitarian effort are objectifying, regardless of what (Red)’s intentions concerning these representations may have been.

This is because they are informed by, form part of, and re-present an entire series of significations – a discourse – about Africa. This discourse is what I named earlier as always already present, the discourse within which Conrad, Schweitzer, Wedgwood, and the Western liberal tradition signify Africa, outside of which it cannot signify.

This does not suggest that the discourse is static: its significations are modified constantly even as they are reproduced, and the success of for example the abolition movement, various struggles for independence in Africa, and the end of Apartheid, testify to changing meanings. However, what (Red)'s representations demonstrate is that these changes in meanings do not occur in the form of a Hegelian dialectic, in which progress is made in each re-evaluation of these meanings. There is no *Aufhebung*, or upliftment of the discourse from a lower, more vulgar view to progressively more enlightened interpretations. Or there is, but within these upliftments, and their negations of previous meanings, there is something of these meanings that is also conserved, as the changes in meaning, in order to remain meaningful, must contain something of what was meant before. What has been said sets an absolute limit on what can be said. Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas, though resurrected, must still represent death, and the upliftment of Africa must represent its intrinsic downtroddenness, and the “first world’s” ability to uplift.

This claim, this argument, seems rather far removed from what Silvia, Nigel, and Elimas represent, and represent (Red) representing: real money buying real medicine for real people with real illness. Why should representation matter in the face of real life? For one thing, to make this distinction between representation and reality is to consider representation only as depiction; yet it is also

*the process by which somebody else – the representative – ‘substitutes for’ and at the same time ‘embodies’ the represented. The conditions for a perfect representation, [sic] would be met, it seems, when the representation is a direct process of transmission of the will of the represented, when the act of representation is totally transparent in the relation of that will. This presupposes that the will is fully constituted and that the role of the representative is exhausted in its function of intermediation. Thus the opaqueness inherent in any substitution and embodiment must be reduced to a minimum; the body in which the incarnation takes place must be almost invisible.*<sup>18</sup>

This second sense of the word might give an indication why (Red) and “first world” representations matter, especially when we consider the extent to which (Red) fulfills the criteria for representation that Laclau identifies. (Red) can perhaps be seen as transmitting the will of the represented when it acts to raise money for medication on behalf of AIDS patients who cannot afford treatment. But its “body” can hardly be seen as transparent: the “Lazarus effect” pictures depict Africans as other, the manifesto maintains a distinction between us and them, and acknowledges that “(Red) is not a charity. It’s a business model.”

The interests (Red) represents are not only the interests of Africa. It clearly also represents the interests of the participating companies, and the representations of Africa serve at least as much to market the (Red) products – to allow them, in the modern “first world” consumer society requiring “identical needs in innumerable places to be satisfied by identical goods”<sup>19</sup> to create the impression that they are serving a different need – as to raise awareness and money in the fight against AIDS in Africa. Thus, even as Silvia, Nigel and Elimas represent themselves and Africa by being represented by (Red), they also serve to represent – to stand for and embody the interests of – multi-million dollar companies.

Furthermore, the extent to which Africa has a fully constituted will that can be represented is questionable, even though (Red) seems to imply an Africa that is fully constituted in its poverty, in its people’s struggle against AIDS. What exactly is “Africa?” Is it a continent? A land mass (separate, but not separated from another continent; separated, but not separate from itself, its many islands)? Does “African” designate the location of our birth? A skin color? A set of beliefs or languages? Must it imply one of these, or all of these? Must it imply poverty, and AIDS?

Because there are many other possible ways of talking about “Africa,” it is perhaps also through representing Africa as a single truth, as syllogism, that (Red) again serves the interests of the “first world” discourse I have tried to represent, which is a discourse “on the concept of race” and ethnicity, a “system of ‘phantasms’” (as there is no fully constituted “Africa”), a “representation of nature, life, history, religion, and law”<sup>20</sup> that perpetually constitutes Africa as other. Though one can hardly argue that the “first world” has a fully constituted identity either, this representation of Africa as other to the “first world” nonetheless inters difference sufficiently, constantly reconstituting Africa as a negative of a negative, to guarantee the perpetuation of this discourse not only in its textual presentations – which may include texts on life, history, religion and the law – but also in its institutions – which enforce the law, trade, educate, treat, etc. – and the very views about the nature of the world, the law, health, wealth, Africa and the “first world,” that are possible within it.

The discourse of Africa as other is a discourse of domination. It is a discourse that has justified the enslavement of people, imperialism, and Apartheid. And although this discourse is itself not fully constituted, is constantly changing, resisted, negated, buried, it is always already there, always conserved, uplifted, resurrected, is the justification for an “imperialism-without-colonies” that rules through the power of “finance capital and huge multi-nationals to direct the flows of capital, commodities, armaments and media information”<sup>21</sup>, and is represented by (Red). It is represented by (Red), and this representation, which presents again (resurrects) Africa as wholly other, and because wholly other represents domination. For the “struggle to end domination” is also the struggle to move “from object to subject”<sup>22</sup>.

And without resurrecting Africa into the form of subject – which (Red) cannot do, since it cannot truly represent Africa, all that it simultaneously is and is not (as I cannot do, in this paper and elsewhere, writing as I must within this discourse because there is nothing outside it, because to challenge it, to respond to it, means to remember it, and thus, in some sense, to repeat it, represent it, resurrect it) – (Red)’s intervention may be characterized not as upliftment, but as relief. It is relief because it provides assistance at least to some in need in Africa; it is relief because it makes Africa visible, draws attention to its poverty and its otherness; and it is relief because by representing it, it stands in the place of Africa, displacing Africa and interring its meanings, bringing its own, and the “first world’s,” interests – which may include (though that is perhaps to be represented in another study) the desire for relief from the guilt of subjecthood and domination, manifested here in the form of relief from the guilt of consumerism – into relief.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Manifesto, accessed 14 February 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Satre., J-P. 2006. *Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism*. Translated by Haddour, A., Brewer, S. & McWilliams, T. London: Routledge. p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> About, accessed 14 May 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Smith, T. 2007. “#17 President – Product Red.” In “USF MBA Podcast.” <http://usfmbapodcast.com/2007/02/25/17-president-of-product-red/>. Accessed 15 May 2008.

<sup>5</sup> In a video called “The Lazarus Effect” (available on: About, accessed 14 May 2008).

<sup>6</sup> My use of the word “inter” here, and elsewhere in this paper, recalls (to life) the use of the word by Derrida in, for example “Positions” (1981).

<sup>7</sup> Slightly different versions of these images appear in Alex Shoumatoff’s article, “The Lazarus Effect” (2007: 221-223), on the subject. Most notably, the “after” pictures in Shoumatoff’s article are in full colour.

<sup>8</sup> Conrad, J. 1988. *Heart of Darkness*. New York: W.W. Norton. p. 20-21.

<sup>9</sup> Achebe, C. 1988. “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*.” Pp. 251-262. in Conrad, J. *Heart of Darkness*. New York: W.W. Norton. p. 256.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Guerin, W. L., Labor, E., Morgan, L., Reesman, J.C. & Willingham, J.R. 2005. *A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press. p.316

<sup>12</sup> Cited in Achebe 1988: 257.

<sup>13</sup> For more extensive examinations of how *Frankenstein* may be seen to relate to questions of ethnicity, see Malchow (1996) and Spivak (1985).

<sup>14</sup> Shelley M. 1993. *Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus*. Project Gutenberg

<sup>15</sup> Abdel-Malek cited in Wallerstein I. W. 2006. *European Universalism*. New York: New Press. p. 35.

<sup>16</sup> Abdel-Malek in Wallerstein 2006: 35.

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<sup>17</sup> Wallerstein explores related issues in his arguments against interventionism, noting, for example, that the 1960 United Nations Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was shortly followed by a “new emphasis on the human rights of individuals and groups [in] world politics” that, according to Wallerstein, “essentially restored” the “first world” “emphasis on the duty of the civilized to suppress barbarism” (2006:16), and thus the “first world’s” right to intervention.

<sup>18</sup> Laclau, E. 2007. *Emancipations*. London: Verso. p. 97.

<sup>19</sup> Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. 1992. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Translated by Cumming, J. London: Verso. p.121.

<sup>20</sup> Derrida, J. 1986. “Racism’s Last Word.” Pp. 329-338. In “Race,” *Writing and Difference*. Edited by Gates, H.L. Jr. University of Chicago Press. p.333.

<sup>21</sup> McClintock A. 2004. “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-Colonialism.’” Pp. 1185-1196. In *Literary Theory: An Anthology*. Edited by Rivkin, J. & Ryan, M. Malden: Blackwell. p.1189

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