

The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect

by

Ama Biney

“Nkrumah is a reminder not of what Africa is, but of what Africa must become.” Kofi Hadjor, 1986.

Abstract

The focus of this article is to re-evaluate Nkrumah’s legacy in terms of the controversies surrounding him as a political figure and his vision for achieving a continental union government for Africa via Pan-Africanism as a solution to Africa’s many economic, social and political problems. Second, this work reviews Ali Mazrui’s positive and negative Nkrumahism construct, and examines Nkrumah’s single party state from 1964 onwards and thus his authoritarian system of government which led to an increasing concentration of power and an undemocratic government.

Introduction

As the twenty-first century unfolds, the face of Nelson Mandela is instantly recognisable around the globe. That of Kwame Nkrumah, who was once the Nelson Mandela of the 1950s and 1960s is less known to a new generation of Africans on the African continent and in the Diaspora. Therefore it is essential that the achievements, relevance and a reassessment of Kwame Nkrumah’s role and contribution to African history are acknowledged. However, among diehard African political activists and Pan-Africanists, Nkrumah was and continues to remain a revered hero, committed nationalist and Pan-Africanist deserving of high esteem.

Yet, Nkrumah's historical reputation is shrouded in considerable ambivalence and controversy. His performance as independent Ghana's first leader and his policies on the domestic, African and international stage have continued to generate lively debate within African studies and in popular forums. African listeners to BBC Focus on Africa reflected the popularity of Nkrumah in a poll in December 1999. Nkrumah was voted "Africa's Man of the Millennium." In a *New African* 2004 poll of a 100 greatest Africans Nkrumah was considered number two, "a true son of Africa." The top position was given to Mandela.

However, as Charles Abugre suggests, Nkrumah's historical legacy is far from being monolithic. He writes:

Dead politicians are different things to different people. Both their good and their wrong define the goal posts and hence the playing fields upon which the survivors take their positions in society. Their good is usurped, their failures exhumed and magnified as appropriate and in accordance with creed. It is in the nature of humanity to review the past, for in doing so we not only define our own essence but also seek to learn lessons if we genuinely desire to do so.

Shakespeare wrote "the evil that men do lives after them but the good is interred with their bones." Of deceased political figures, Abdul-Raheem writes: "Politically, victims and beneficiaries remember both. It is the balance between the two [the good and the bad achievements] that determines their place in the politics of memory, which, like all memories, is prone to being selective."ⁱ Even General J. A. Ankrah, who headed the Supreme Military Council that took over after the 24 February 1966 coup d'etat that toppled Nkrumah, confirmed that his place in African history had been assured.

In short, Nkrumah has been vilified and revered for both his failures and achievements by scholars and ordinary people alike. However, it is imperative that we contextualise Nkrumah and understand what motivated him, for the present generation is far removed from the indecent denial of human and particularly political rights Africans were subjected to. Given that whites ruled over Africans during the colonial era and believed it was their destiny and responsibility to do so, because Africans were racially inferior, marked the height of European imperial arrogance and racial supremacy. The "white man's burden" justified European economic exploitation and political domination over Africans. Nkrumah courageously challenged this prevailing orthodoxy in his readiness to mobilise thousands to fight for political independence, go to prison and his various axioms. Among his well known adages are: "We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity;" "We have the right to live as men" and "We have the right to govern ourselves."

The focus of this article is to re-evaluate Nkrumah's legacy in terms of the controversies surrounding him as a political figure and the two intellectual templates he can be said to have bequeathed future Africans. According to Ali Mazrui, "positive Nkrumahism," bequeathed by Nkrumah provides inspiration and motivation for a better future for Africa and African people. In essence, Nkrumah can be said to have provided a vision for achieving Continental Union Government for Africa or a United States of Africa. He passionately advocated Pan-Africanism as the solution to Africa's myriad economic, social and political problems. He believed no single African nation could progress without unifying politically and economically with other African countries in order to harness the economic potential and resources of the continent for the betterment of its people. However, what Mazrui terms "negative Nkrumahism," is also an integral aspect of Nkrumah's heritage.ⁱⁱ Nkrumah's period in power gave rise to a single party state from 1964 onwards and an authoritarian system of government, which led to an increasing concentration of power in Nkrumah's hands as well as undemocratic government. We shall explore both legacies.

Debates in the Literature

In the 1950s Ghana and Kenya emerged as the two models of British decolonization on the African continent. The former was symbolic of the peaceful and constitutional route in the transfer of power and the latter of the more violent path. Both countries were constantly in the news and their nationalist leaders, Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta became household names. Nkrumah became a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent strategy of "Satyagraha" (soul force), which he coined as "Positive Action." This strategy was diametrically opposed to the armed struggle of the Mau Mau, which Kenyatta was erroneously associated with. These antithetical decolonising strategies alarmed the British authorities. In the climate of Cold War suspicions and tensions both leaders were suspected of being communists and using violence as an illegitimate method of agitation to achieve their political ends. Both leaders were imprisoned by the British and used the term "prison graduate" to consolidate their status as nationalist leaders.ⁱⁱⁱ

A broad literature on Ghana and Nkrumah emerged in the 1960s. Early scholarly writings included a social political history of the country^{iv} and a plethora of biographical work.^v Other emphases have included the nature of the handover of power in Ghana;^{vi} the emergence of political opposition to Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP);^{vii} the rise and nature of the one party state Nkrumah created in independent Ghana;^{viii} and his economic policies from 1957 to 1966.^{ix}

As Cooper maintains:

There is a particular poignancy to the history of Ghana because it was the pioneer. Kwame Nkrumah was more than a political leader; he was a prophet of independence, of anti-imperialism, of Pan-Africanism. His oft-quoted phrase 'Seek ye first the political kingdom' was not just a call for Ghanaians to demand a voice in the affairs of state, but a plea for leaders and ordinary citizens to use power for a purpose – to transform a colonized society into a dynamic and prosperous land of opportunity.^x

Similarly, Amilcar Cabral, the Guinea-Bissau leader, characterised Nkrumah in his eulogy as “the strategist of genius in the struggle against classic colonialism.”^{xi} Hodgkin argues that Nkrumah’s “radical Pan-Africanism had an influence on the attitudes and behaviour of a substantial body of people.”^{xii} In terms of the positive impact of Nkrumah, the founding president of Namibia, Sam Nujoma maintains: “Ghana’s fight for freedom inspired and influenced us all, and the greatest contribution to our political awareness at that time came from the achievements of Ghana after its independence. It was from Ghana that we got the idea that we must do more than just petition the UN to bring about our own independence.” Kenneth Kaunda who led Zambia to independence claims, “Nkrumah inspired many people of Africa towards independence and was a great supporter of the liberation of southern Africa from apartheid and racism.”^{xiii} Nkrumah’s uncompromising announcement that “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless linked to the total liberation of the African continent” translated into moral, logistical and material support for dependent territories across the African continent to become politically free. However, in the post-independence period it led him to be the focus of opprobrium from neighbouring African leaders who considered his actions in aiding political dissidents as interference in the sovereignty of other states.

Nkrumah was central to the major debates and issues of the decolonization period of the 1950s and 1960s. Among these was the emergence of the modernisation paradigm, which assumed that newly independent states would seek to imitate European systems of governance, economic growth, and values in order to build cohesive nation-states.^{xiv} In attempting to forge national unity among disparate ethnic and religious groups, the belief was that these newly independent states would abandon tradition for “modernity.” Nugent claims, “a general sense of optimism was also reflected in the writings of an emergent community of Africanist scholars” during this time.^{xv} By the end of the 1970s there had long been a discrediting of modernisation theories. The mood of optimism had dissipated and was transformed into “Afro-pessimism” during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Daddieh, in the aftermath of independence:

a combination of charisma and efficacious leadership generated widespread popular support and legitimacy for the new leaders. However, legitimacy was highly contextualised in the sense that the mobilised masses developed an instrumentalist conception of political independence. They viewed it as a prelude to material progress and social welfare. In short, legitimacy was based on a fundamental African social compact in which the new political elites promised, at least implicitly, to produce less poverty and less inequality, in exchange for popular support.^{xvi}

Implicit in Nkrumah's famous dictum "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you" was the promise of an economic paradise and accompanying riches for Ghanaian citizens of the newly independent state. It led Nkrumah in April 1957 to accept Ivory Coast's nationalist leader Houphouët-Boigny's challenge as to which country would be more developed in ten years. The "West African wager" as it became known was part of the era's focus on the efficacy of development strategies.^{xvii} Nkrumah moved further to the political left and Ivory Coast espoused commitment to a free market economy and reliance on French technical expertise and private investment.

Nkrumah lost his wager with Houphouët Boigny, failing to transform Ghana into an economic paradise.^{xviii} Whether this was on account of the socialist shift he made in 1961 is debateable. Yet, as Young argues, "the Nkrumah shift in 1961 appeared part of a much broader movement in Africa" that was committed to creating a more egalitarian society on socialist lines in achieving material prosperity.^{xix} Along with Friedland and Rosberg, he maintains that the ideological spectrum broadened during the first two decades of African independence and socialism became an attractive ideology to several African leaders.^{xx} Similarly, Killick contends that Nkrumah's adoption of a socialist economic strategy was part of the general trend towards development economics, adopted by many developing countries at the time.^{xxi} Green also subscribes to the view that Nkrumah's socialist economic strategy was flawed by weak implementation but despite this it was a rational and prudent policy choice.^{xxii} Ghana under Nkrumah was one among what Friedland and Rosberg characterise as the "first wave" of socialist regimes in the 1960s.^{xxiii} Countries in this "first wave" included Tanzania, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. Collectively this broad group is characterised by Young as "populist socialism" or 'African socialism' on account of the fact that a socialist perspective shaped – or at least legitimated major policy decisions in these countries.^{xxiv}

As Young states, “despite the tendency of socialism to dominate ideological discourse, it was never in reality the most widespread guide to policy choice in the 1960s because nobody loved capitalism, and “there was something shameful about openly espousing it.”^{xxv} Such a stance led some countries such as Malawi, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast to describe themselves as “pragmatic” as they remained uncomfortable with the term “capitalist.”

Some scholars such as Young and Metz place Nkrumah firmly in the “African socialism” school of thought. However, in 1966, in an article entitled ‘African Socialism’ Nkrumah clearly distanced himself from this brand of socialism.^{xxvi} Metz maintains that compared to Nyerere, Nkrumah’s theoretical position on socialism, adhered more closely to Marxist orthodoxy. Nkrumah subscribed to dialectical materialist analysis and believed that African society was a fusion of the traditional African way of life, Euro-Christian and Islamic influences which he delineated in his book *Consciencism* published in 1964. He did not urge a return to an idyllic traditional African society as his contemporary Nyerere did.

Several African countries later adopted the term “scientific socialism” in the late 1960s and 1970s, including Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. Nkrumah also used the term in his writings and called himself a “scientific socialist and a Marxist.”^{xxvii} Placing political labels aside, Young contends that “ideology alone will not explain relative success or failure in achieving the central goal of a better life for the citizenry.” Political effectiveness is equally important in policy implementation in order to achieve increased material prosperity.

Nkrumah was profoundly motivated by an ideological vision of radical socialist socio-economic transformation for both Ghana and Africa. According to Young “ideology is not to be dismissed as simple, evanescent rhetoric.” Yet, “few rulers are such philosophically inspired kings as to apply ideology alone to policy reason.”^{xxviii} Whilst Nkrumah was ideologically motivated, he was also a pragmatist who was not bound to ideological dogmatism. Consequently his vision was on occasion in tension with flawed and misjudged policy decisions that appeared inconsistent with his ideological preference. As Young writes: “Such dissonance may be rationalised as either not truly inconsistent with ideology correctly understood or as a conscious and temporary departure from rectitude; it does not annul the worldview with which it is in tension.”^{xxix} Therefore, it is essential to examine Nkrumah’s ideological vision of the world and how he sought to transform Ghana and Africa.

Nkrumah's Ideological Vision

From his student days at Lincoln University in America to his death, Nkrumah was totally committed to the liberation of Africa. He was inspired by the ideals of: freedom, equality, independence, and social justice.

These convictions underpinned his ambitions for self-determination for the Gold Coast, as Ghana was called at the time. He envisioned all social groups in African society had a role to play in mobilising for political independence via a campaign of "Positive Action." This Gandhian strategy of boycotts, strikes, leafleting, and educational campaigns included women, youth groups, farmers associations and trade unions and was outlined in his small book *Towards Colonial Freedom*, published in 1947.^{xxx} Apart from Gandhi's non-violent philosophy, among the other individuals who politically and intellectually inspired Nkrumah were: James E. K. Aggrey, assistant vice-principal of the Government Training College in Accra; Mr S. R. Wood who introduced Nkrumah to politics;^{xxxi} Kobina Sekyi a Gold Coast lawyer and activist and the writings of Nnamdi Azikiwe's radical newspaper *The African Morning Post*. However, Nkrumah writes in his *Autobiography* that it was *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*, published in 1923 that impacted on him profoundly.^{xxxii}

For Nkrumah the Gold Coast or Ghana was a microcosm of his vision for the entire African continent. He believed: "The independence of Ghana was the first crack in the seemingly impregnable armour of imperialism in Africa. It created and furnished the bridgehead for organised assaults upon colonialism in Africa."^{xxxiii} Consequently, once in power Nkrumah devoted Ghana's resources to assisting other African countries attain political independence. For example, when Guinea under President Sekou Toure said "No!" to General De Gaulle's notion of independence under a French community, Ghana under Nkrumah loaned Guinea ten million pounds sterling after the French pulled out in haste with the intentions of punishing Toure's impudent stance. In addition, Nkrumah gave material and financial assistance to numerous African liberation movements and allowed African freedom fighters to seek sanctuary in Ghana.

Nkrumah's critics and detractors such as Peter Omari accuse Nkrumah of "sacrificing Ghana on the altar of Pan-Africanism" in squandering the country's economic riches in Pan-Africanist projects.^{xxxiv} Yet, for Nkrumah, Ghana's economic progress was inextricably tied to the fundamental economic, social, political development of the entire African continent. For Nkrumah, Ghana and Africa were inseparable. Their destinies and futures were one. In his infamous book, *Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism*, Nkrumah wrote: "Economic unity to be effective must be accompanied by political unity. The two are inseparable, each necessary for the future greatness of our continent, and the development of our resources."^{xxxv}

He considered Continental Union Government for Africa as not only the means by which each African country could survive but “unity is the first requisite for destroying neo-colonialism.”^{xxxvi} Neo-colonialism, as defined by Nkrumah was the economic and political relationship between Africa’s corrupt ruling class who in partnership with Western multi-national corporations and Western leaders continued to siphon Africa’s wealth out of the continent to the detriment of Africa’s people. Nkrumah maintained that whilst African countries were politically free, they lacked genuine economic freedom. Nkrumah genuinely believed “only a united Africa can redeem its past glory and renew and reinforce its strength for the realisation of its destiny. We are today the richest and yet the poorest of continents, but in unity our continent could smile in a new era of prosperity and power.”^{xxxvii} Fundamentally, African unity was the only solution by which Africans could regain their respect, dignity and equality in the world.

It was in his book *Africa Must Unite* which he distributed widely to African heads of state before the historic founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 that he put forward his most cogent thesis for the political and economic integration of Africa’s resources and institutions. The intention was to win over his contemporaries to achieve Continental Union Government for Africa. In his own words: “We need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from the very positive dangers of returning colonialism in disguised forms. We need it to combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent and still holding back millions of our brothers. We need it to secure total African liberation.”^{xxxviii} He warned that: “At present most of the independent states are moving in directions which expose us to the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism.”^{xxxix}

For Nkrumah, continental economic planning would maximise Africa’s industrial and economic resources in a co-ordinated and rational manner. It would counteract what he considered “the dubious advantages of association with the so-called European Common market.”^{xl} Similarly, the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy would render unnecessary “separate efforts to build or maintain vast military forces for self-defence which would be ineffective in any major attack upon our separate states.”^{xli} Nkrumah considered the consequences of failure to combine military resources for common defence as likely to give rise to insecurity and the opportunities for entering into defence pacts with foreign powers, which would endanger the security of all African states. Lastly, a common foreign policy would enable Africa “to speak with one voice in the councils of the world” such as the UN and other international bodies.^{xlii} He envisaged a continental parliament composed of a lower house to discuss problems facing Africa and an upper house to ensure equality of the associated states, regardless of size and population. He urged that the process towards continental government should begin with a nucleus of a few states committed to the objectives of political and economic unity and “leave the door open for the attachment of others as they desire to join or reach the freedom which would allow them to do so.”^{xliii}

For Nkrumah, the USA, USSR, Europe and Canada were models of the positive benefits of union. However, he was prudent in emphasizing that any supranational structure for Africa did not mean an abrogation of national sovereignty. He emphasized that African states “would continue to exercise independent authority except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in the interests of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.”^{xliv}

Overall, Nkrumah upheld “that the continental union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum if we are determined to move forward to a realisation of our hopes and plans for creating a modern society.” He ended the book with a sense of the historical opportunities African unity presented the leaders and people of Africa. He appealed to African leaders thus: “Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to the leaders of Africa. It is for us to grasp what is a golden opportunity to prove that the genius of the African people can surmount the separatist tendencies in sovereign nationhood by coming together speedily, for the sake of Africa’s greater glory and infinite well-being, into a Union of African states.”^{xlv} Whether his contemporaries read *Africa Must Unite* is uncertain, but it prepared the political ground for him to further enunciate his Pan-African ambitions at the founding of the OAU.

Kofi Batsa gives a glimpse of Nkrumah’s electrifying address to his contemporaries at the historic founding of the OAU. He writes:

I sat behind Nkrumah when he spoke to the OAU conference in Addis Ababa in 1963 and I watched the faces of the leaders as he left his prepared script and pointing at each in turn, at Haile Selassie, at Tafawa Balewa, at Modibo Kaita, at Maga; he said: ‘If we do not come together, if we do not unite, we shall all be thrown out, all of us one by one – and I also will go’. He said: ‘The OAU must face a choice now – we can either move forward to progress through our effective African Union or step backward into stagnation, instability and confusion – an easy prey for foreign intervention, interference and subversion.’ He got a standing ovation for that speech and although we felt he should have been calmer and that perhaps he had gone too far, his reaction was, ‘Let me tell them, let me tell them.’^{xlvi}

It was at the 1964 OAU summit meeting that Nkrumah put forward his idea of an African High Command to a caustic rebuff from Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, “the most eloquent exponent of the gradualist approach.”^{xlvii} Mwalimu (“teacher”), as Nyerere was popularly referred to, believed that a United States of Africa could not be achieved in one step and could not happen overnight.

Nyerere made a stinging attack on Nkrumah when he accused him of employing the notion of Union Government for propaganda purposes. He declared: “I am becoming increasingly convinced that we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental Government and will patiently work for its realization, removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union Government’ for the purpose of propaganda.”^{xlviii} Moreover, he went on to question the repudiation of the East African Federation as contrary to African unity.^{xlix} He rebuked Nkrumah when he questioned why the notion of Union Government, which implied a single state of Africa, did not mean the surrendering of each state’s individual sovereignty. Nyerere said: “It is some curious animal to which our individual states do not surrender sovereignty, and yet somehow becomes the strong instrument which we require to fulfil the purposes of modern states.”^{li} For Nyerere, “To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope that the Almighty will one day say, ‘Let there be unity in Africa,’ and there shall be unity.”^{lii} Furthermore, “to say that the step by step method was invented by the imperialists is to reach the limits of absurdity.”^{lii} Nkrumah had met his intellectual equal at the OAU summit of 1964. “It was, in all” claims Agyeman “a spirited performance that left the objective of a Union Government bleeding to death on the floor of the Cairo conference hall, speared, as it were, by Nyerere’s flashing verbalism.”^{liii}

Nkrumah’s address emphasised the urgent necessity for the acceptance, at least in principle, of the idea of setting up Union Government for Africa. In his speech he lamented “the economic subservience of many African countries.” He insisted he did not “spurn foreign trade” but rather implored his contemporaries to “organise [the] African economy as a unit.”^{liv} He upheld that “the appeal for a Union Government of Africa is therefore not being made merely to satisfy a political end. It is absolutely indispensable for our economic survival in this modern world of ours.”^{lv}

The consensus of opinion at the meeting was that Nkrumah’s proposal was not only premature but, in the opinion of Ahmed Ben Bella, it was considered “pie in the sky.”^{lvi} There was also a consensus of opinion that favoured economic co-operation as opposed to Nkrumah’s political union. It was decided by the majority to refer Nkrumah’s radical proposal for the establishment of Union Government for Africa to the OAU’s specialised commission for study. But this decision was an obvious attempt at “tactical side-stepping.”^{lvii}

The underlying thrust of Nkrumah's opening speech at the summit meeting of the 1965 OAU conference was predictable. Despite the unfolding problems on the African continent, specifically, the escalating rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and the issue of political refugees in Africa, both were simply a confirmation for Nkrumah of the necessity for a Union Government for Africa.^{lviii} He said: "Nothing that has happened since our Addis Ababa conference or Cairo meetings has caused me to alter my mind about the necessity of a Union Government for Africa." In fact, he insisted "the growing perils in Africa and on the international scene, the growing strictures on world trade, the growing impoverishment of our primary producers, the persistent border disputes in Africa, the increasing instability caused by interference and subversive activities, the continued defiance and insolence of the racist minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia – all these urge me to continue our pursuit for the political unification of Africa."^{lix} Nkrumah considered it was "necessary to strengthen the Charter of the OAU by providing an effective machinery" in the form of an Executive Council of the OAU to act as an arm of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Council's responsibilities would be to implement the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.^{lx} Unfortunately for Nkrumah, the two-third vote needed to establish a Council was never obtained.^{lxi}

Without question, underlying Nkrumah's conception of African unity was a vision of African society constructed on socialist lines. Nevertheless, whilst Nkrumah sought to transform Ghana and Africa into a self-reliant economic and technological giant, he failed. Part of his failure lies in his authoritarian methods that we shall now explore.

Nkrumah and the Single Party State in Africa

The consensus in the literature on the post-colonial African state is that Nkrumah's legacy for African political practice was largely a negative one. As Zolberg writes: "When the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, the event was greeted in much of the American press as a triumph of ancient Wilsonian ideals. Ghana was now the exemplar."^{lxii} However, "even the most sympathetic observers, however, soon began to discern political patterns which indicated that liberation from foreign rule might not coincide with the birth of democracy."^{lxiii} Nkrumah's decline into authoritarianism was marked with the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1958 and its subsequent amendments, the detention of political opponents, the non-existence of civilian groups and political bodies unaffiliated to the Nkrumah's ruling Convention People's Party (CPP), increasingly stringent security measures after 1962 and the lack of independence of the judiciary. This was followed by the inauguration of a one-party state in 1964.

Yet, to what extent is it fair to charge Nkrumah with establishing the model of an autocratic state? Was it expecting too much of Ghana and Nkrumah to act as an exemplar in unchartered political waters? We can now objectively re-assess and answer these questions with the benefit of time and a brief comparative analysis of political developments in the West African region.

Ali Mazrui is among those critics who have attributed the emergence of the single party phenomenon to Nkrumah.^{lxiv} He writes: “By a strange twist of destiny Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was both the hero who carried the torch of Pan-Africanism and the villain who started the whole legacy of the one-party-state in Africa. To that extent, Kwame Nkrumah started the whole tradition of Black authoritarianism in the post-colonial era. He was the villain of the piece.”^{lxv}

Nkrumah, Mazrui argues, reconstructed himself into a “Leninist Czar”^{lxvi} – merging both the monarchical tendency, which was reflected in his use of the title “Osagyefo” and the Leninist vanguard tradition. Mazrui contends that three factors led Nkrumah towards the one-party state. Firstly, his fundamental belief that Ghana was unsuited for a multi-party system on account of its regional and ethnic cleavages. For Nkrumah, the one-party state was the only remedy to political tribalism and the problem of integrating the Asante kingdom into Ghana. Secondly, Nkrumah believed that African communities were guided by the cultural principles of harmony, co-operation, collectivism and consensus. This vision of “traditional” Africa was presented in Nkrumah’s book *Consciencism*. Hence, intellectually, for Nkrumah, manipulated consent was desirable rather than dissent and disunity.^{lxvii} Lastly, his adoption of “democratic centralism” in Central Committee and Cabinet decision-making were borrowed from Lenin and in the view of Mazrui, this precipitated his descent into authoritarian rule.

The criticism that Nkrumah instituted a one-party state in the face of the challenge of building a nation-state is a valid one. Yet, Nkrumah reached the same conclusion as his contemporaries Sekou Toure, Houphouet-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, Modibo Keita, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta. Whilst the Ivory Coast and Senegal purported to be multi-party states, they were *de facto* one party states in which other parties had no chance of winning state power. In other words they were one-party states by another name. In short, these various African states were all attempting to grapple with the same issues as Nkrumah: how does a nation-state prevent descent into a religious and ethnic fragmentation of society? Setting aside ideology, Houphouet-Boigny (probably the most right wing of African leaders), Jomo Kenyatta (who paid lip service to socialist rhetoric but promoted a capitalist orientation of the Kenyan economy), and Nkrumah who professed a commitment to scientific socialism from 1962 onwards – all resorted to similar political methods to deal with the societal problems of building a united nation.

Nigeria and Uganda, which also faced acute problems of regional and ethnic divisions, had myriad political parties and groups that favoured both a centralised and decentralised political system as a means of welding the country together and of creating autonomy for minority groups.

In the context of nation building in post-independent Africa, there was a rush for the spoils of political office and the state by some “big men” (and big women) who made promises to their followers, which they failed to fulfil in the challenge of building a nation-state via a single party. Instead, politics became a zero sum game in which the redistribution of wealth was replaced by a looting of the state’s coffers. Models of the allocation of goods, benefits, contracts, licences, salaries, appointments and various other spoils in the post-colonial states have been presented in the discourse by Bayart’s thesis of the “politics of the belly;” Mbembe’s concept of the “post-colony” and Young’s model of “Bula Matari” and “the integral state.”^{lxviii} These models have shown the acquisitive and authoritarian nature of the post-colonial African state. Characteristics of such a state have been the failure to redistribute wealth; the systematic use of compulsion and violence by African rulers to maintain power, in a manner not dissimilar from their colonial predecessors; and the emergence of new conflicts between the poor and the powerful. In short, “as to eat has become a matter of life and death,” the failure of the African state to provide for its citizens has turned the dominated and the dominant into hustlers for economic and political power.^{lxix} Thus, the consequences of such failed states has been a “disengagement from the area of the state” and or “evasion,” if not “lip service” being paid on the part of ordinary Africans to the state.^{lxx}

In addressing the question: to what extent did Nkrumah establish the template of authoritarian rule in post-independent Africa, our starting point in addressing such a question must be Nkrumah’s own concept of social unity, conflict and cleavage which was similar to that of his West African counterparts in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali and Guinea and elsewhere, in spite of ideological differences.^{lxxi} Nkrumah believed that the formation of groups based on ethnic affiliation, religion, and region were illegitimate bases for the organisation of political groups as they threatened the unity of the nation. They were an impediment towards progress, modernity and nation building.^{lxxii} As Zolberg contends, the one party ideology was evident in several West African states, including Ghana in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, there were distinct nuances in political practice amongst the various West African countries.

The first country to make visible its ideological leanings was Guinea.^{lxxiii} It was under Sekou Toure who declared “No!” to membership in De Gaulle’s French community in 1958 that were the beginnings of radical pronouncements.

The new government led by President Sekou Toure produced copious programmes, speeches and congress papers on the need to eliminate colonialism, which gave rise to the perception that the Parti Democratique de Guinea (PDG), had a radical ideological outlook. Zolberg argues: “The major themes of the one-party ideology of Guinea were rapidly echoed elsewhere with local variations. It is difficult to determine whether there were genuine inter-country influences at work or whether the concepts were reinvented autonomously in each case because they corresponded to a common situation.”^{lxxiv} Hence, whilst Ghana is considered the exemplar, other African countries mapped out their own developmentalist path that shared strong parallels with the former “model colony.”

Similarly, in July 1959, President Senghor of Senegal, proclaimed at the first congress of the Parti de la Federation Africaine (PFA), that a united party was also inclusive. He declared, “the opposition must pursue the same goal as the majority party.” Yet, at the same time, he viewed the opposition as being subordinate to foreign manipulation and therefore it was the responsibility of the PFA to forestall internal subversion. This ambiguity on the part of Senghor leads Zolberg to question: “How, then, does Senghor’s “unified” party differ from the “single” party?”^{lxxv} Clearly, there is little difference. In the Ivory Coast the Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire (PDCI) led by Houphouet Boigny did not “self-consciously discuss ideology” though the emphasis on a united nation was made as far back as 1946.^{lxxvi} Zolberg points out “not only is the absence of opposition [in Ivory Coast] an indication of unity, but because unity has been achieved, there is no reason for opposition to exist.”^{lxxvii} Whilst a populist character to the dominant political parties existed in Guinea, Mali and Ghana, this was absent in Ivory Coast. Also, in the Ivory Coast “the state owes its legitimacy to the party, the party owes its own increasingly to the leader,” which was similarly the case in Ghana.

In the realm of ideology in West Africa, there were also parallels and differences. Between 1949 and 1959 the CPP’s ideology was in an embryonic state. This changed when Nkrumah addressed the tenth anniversary congress of his party. He proclaimed the indistinguishability of the party and the people; the party with the nation; and that the CPP was supreme over all other institutions. Zolberg contends that:

Although the Ghanaians completed the construction of their one party ideology later than most other countries, they not only caught up with but eventually extended the theory two steps beyond their neighbours: they transformed the one party concept into a legal rule by making of it a constitutional amendment; and furthermore, in a display of blunt honesty, they gave it a meaningful name, Nkrumahism.^{lxxviii}

Zolberg concludes that Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Ivory Coast were all concerned with the avoidance of conflict and the establishment of a rational order.^{lxxxix} The one-party ideology even permeated government economic thinking in the notion of the “plan.” The idea of the plan was an instrument to ensure control and order over the economy. Integral to this thinking was the belief that any arrest or obstruction in the implementation of the plan was the result of sabotage, imperialism or neo-colonial forces at work seeking to overthrow the government. Consequently several West African states during the 1960s, including Ghana, adopted “techniques of suppression” to achieve not only unanimity but also the dominance of the government over the opposition and the state over the entire society.^{lxxx} Yet, in Ghana the implementation of the one-party ideology was a more complex process. However, “the fact of greater publicity [in Ghana]” meant that “there is much more evidence of authoritarianism in Ghana than in any other West African country. But this does not necessarily mean that if regimes are compared in toto, Ghana is in fact more authoritarian; paradoxically the opposite may well be the case.”^{lxxxix}

For Zolberg, what was unique about the single party experiment in Ghana was that it was the only country to have written the one-party state into law, “yet most others, while preserving freedom to organise parties in their constitutions, have multiplied effective legal measures to prevent their appearance.”^{lxxxii} In short, particularistic ethnic and political groups opposing the dominant political party were similarly made illegal in countries such as Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali.^{lxxxiii}

Another significant difference remains between Ghana under Nkrumah and her West African neighbours in regards to the use of capital punishment as an instrument of maintaining one party rule and eliminating the opposition. Nkrumah’s government began as early as 1957 to deport what it perceived as non-Ghanaian citizens from the country, many of whom were charged as being a threat to the security of the state. It is difficult to compare the deportation records for the late 1950s and 1960s of a number of West African countries, on account of the fact that many did not publish them. However, “much more is known about Ghana in this ... because in spite of all, Ghana has retained a greater sense of the rule of law,” contends Zolberg.^{lxxxiv} During the 1960s both Houphouet-Boigny’s and Nkrumah’s government arrested large numbers of political dissidents. Such arrests were not made public in Ivory Coast. “If coercion can be evaluated in terms of the total number of death sentences imposed by a government on its opponents, the Ivory Coast is probably the harshest country in Africa.”^{lxxxv} In comparison, no state executions for political activities took place under Nkrumah’s government.^{lxxxvi}

In summary, the 1960s was a decade of “developmentalist authoritarianism”^{lxxxvii} whereby countries such as Ghana under Nkrumah attempted to modernise the inherited colonial state and failed. The colonial state of the 1950s was “the era of the activist state” which intervened in the affairs of colonial subjects in order to attempt to control for example their labour and health via technical expertise.^{lxxxviii}

“The 1960s African state sought to take over the interventionist aspect of the colonial state, and indeed to intensify it, in the name of the national interest and (for a time) to demonstrate to voters that the state was improving their lives,” maintains Cooper.^{lxxxix} It seems that Nkrumah’s own brand of “developmentalism authoritarianism” had the added imprint of Soviet central planning, which he adopted from 1962 onwards.^{xc} This impacted on the restructuring of the Ghanaian economy with negative results. Nevertheless, Nkrumah was not alone in such political and economic experimentation. In the political sphere as Cooper observes: “Closing down of political space was truly in essentially all of the new African states, but the degree of closure varied greatly, from dictatorships to guided democracy.”^{xc}

For liberal political scientists, Nkrumah’s descent into authoritarianism was lamentable whilst for Marxists his flaw was that he never really became a Marxist-Leninist.^{xcii} Yet, the increasing authoritarianism of Nkrumah needs to be considered in the context of the unwillingness of the political opposition in the form of the National Liberation Movement, later the Ghana Congress Party, to accept the political rules of the game – even under the paternal eyes of the British colonial administration.^{xciii} In the immediate wake of independence in 1957 there were disturbances among the Gas in Accra followed by a conspiracy to overthrow Nkrumah, known as the Labadi Junction affair of December 1958; the Kulungugu assassination attempt on Nkrumah’s life in 1962 and subsequent terrorist bomb throwing in the capital. This was followed by another attempt on Nkrumah’s life in 1964. Such developments provided Nkrumah and the CPP with the justification to suppress its political enemies and safeguard the security of the state and its citizens.

African Unity Post Nkrumah: 1972 – 2005

Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist vision has survived into the twenty-first century and shaped the thinking of a new generation of what Ali Mazrui refers to as "Africans of the soil" (i.e. those Africans born on the African continent) and "Africans of the blood" (those of African descent).^{xciiv} As one of Nkrumah's greatest critics, Mazrui acknowledges:

Nkrumah's greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of continental unification. No one else has made the case for continental integration more forcefully, or with greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most African leaders regard the whole idea of a United States of Africa as wholly unattainable in the foreseeable future, Nkrumah even after death has kept the debate alive through his books and through the continuing influence of his ideas.^{xcv}

As Nkrumah was one of the founding fathers of the OAU, it appears that the most visible impact of his ideas on African unity has been the institutional transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. However, prior to the formation of the AU, two years after his death in 1972, Tanzania hosted the Sixth Pan-African Congress (PAC) in Dar-es-Salaam and the Seventh PAC took place from 3-8 April 1994 in Uganda. There is no doubt that there has been a resurgence in Pan-Africanist thinking, policies and interests on the African continent since Nkrumah's death and it is Nkrumah's ideas and concept of continental unity that continues to motivate Africans within Africa and in the Diaspora.

Just as "Africans of the blood initially pioneered the movement for Pan-Africanism outside the African continent" such individuals again took up the initiative in the early 1970s. "The initiative for organising the Sixth Pan-African Congress came from a small group of Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbeans who met in Bermuda and the United States in 1971 and 1972."^{xcvii} The Trinidadian scholar C. L. R. James had put out a call for the Sixth PAC in the early 1970s and requested the congress be held in Tanzania because it was considered by progressive Africans to be a model of self-reliance. President Nyerere obliged.

He gave an opening address to the Congress in which he reflected some of the ideas, principles and issues of his former ideological opponent, Nkrumah. He paid tribute to leaders such as Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, Wallace Johnson, George Padmore and W.E.B. Dubois.

He commended Nkrumah's All African Peoples' Conference of 1958 to which Africans from North Africa and the Diaspora were present. "It thus reflected the geographical unity of this continent, a policy which has also been followed in the invitations to our present Congress," Nyerere said.^{xcvii} He recognised that the Pan-African movement was a broad one and "not everyone here, and every government or organisation represented, would be pleased to be described as 'socialist,' however vague in meaning that word has become."^{xcviii}

Of concern to all Pan-Africanists were the continued struggles for political freedom being waged in African territories such as South Africa, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and Spanish Sahara. Nyerere surprised the African-American delegates, many of whom were cultural nationalists and who on account of the historical experience of white supremacy in the USA considered race as the primary issue facing Africans, by identifying class oppression as another form of injustice and discrimination that Pan-Africanists needed to address.^{xcix} Nkrumah had earlier made an emphasis on the class dimension of Pan-Africanism in his pamphlet entitled 'The Spectre of Black Power' and in his written exchanges with African-Americans whilst in Conakry.^c

The Tanzanian leader similarly advocated the need for unity between black Africa and Arab Africa. Lastly, Nyerere also remarked that Pan-Africanism should not isolate itself from the rest of the Third World and should seek solidarity with other oppressed groups and peoples of the world.^{ci} Similarly, Nkrumah had envisioned an "Organisation of Solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL)" in his writings of 1968, as well as creating "links with all workers' movements in the capitalist-imperialist states."^{cii} Despite the ideological diversity of views represented at the Sixth PAC, Nyerere's address reflected the continuity of Nkrumah's ideas.

Twenty years later, the Seventh Pan-African Congress took place in April 1994 in Kampala, Uganda. Like the Sixth, a minority of individuals, in particular the Tanzanian Marxist and scholar-activist, Abdul Rahman Babu, initiated it. There was greater representation in terms of numbers of political groups at the Seventh PAC than at the Sixth.^{ciii} Similarly, there was a range of ideological viewpoints and conflicts expressed.^{civ} Congress participants unanimously agreed to resist what was perceived as the recolonization of Africa by global capitalism in its final resolution statement.^{cv} Such a unanimous statement was considered against the prevalent IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes adopted by many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Many post-colonial states had become burdened with debt, civil wars, a continued brain drain, and the crisis of African refugees. It was in this context that the neo-liberal agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions was attacked. The tone, themes and condemnation of re-colonisation of Africa echoed the emphases, thinking and positions expressed by Nkrumah in his infamous book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*.

Three years after the 7th PAC, in 1997 President Nyerere made an important speech in Accra to mark the 40th anniversary of Ghana's independence. Nyerere confessed that:

Kwame Nkrumah was the state crusader for African unity. He wanted the Accra summit of 1965 to establish Union Government for the whole of independent Africa. But we failed. The one minor reason is that Kwame, like all great believers, underestimated the degree of suspicion and animosity, which his crusading passion had created among a substantial number of his fellow Heads of State. The major reason was linked to the first: already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided.^{cv}

Nyerere was quite clear that in 1965 the idea of working out Union Government for Africa “was an unrealistic objective for a single summit.” More importantly, the failure lay in the lost opportunity to “discuss a mechanism for pursuing the objective of a politically united Africa” via establishing a “Unity Committee or undertaking to establish one. We did not. And after Kwame Nkrumah was removed from the African political scene nobody took up the challenge again.”^{cvii} In a forthright admission, the Tanzanian leader concluded: “We of the first generation leaders of independent Africa have not pursued the objective of African Unity with vigour, commitment and sincerity that it deserves. Yet that does not mean that unity is now irrelevant.”^{cviii}

Two years after Nyerere's speech, at the OAU summit in Algeria in July 1999, Nkrumah's dream of continental union government for Africa became relevant to a number of African leaders who sought to transform the OAU into the African Union (AU). The prime movers for the reform of the OAU into the AU were President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, later joined the motives of these leaders. Whilst in exile in Guinea-Conakry in 1968 Nkrumah had lambasted the organisation as being weak and in need of a radical overhaul.^{cix} In the thirty years after his death, lack of strong constitutional structures, the adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the inability to deal effectively with regional conflicts and the characterisation of the OAU as a “dictators club” contributed to the weaknesses of this continental body.^{cx}

According to one academic interpretation, the foreign policy interests of Mbeki, Obasanjo and Gaddafi initiated the rapid transformation of the OAU into the AU between 1999 to 2002.^{cx}

At the extraordinary summit meeting held in Libya in September 1999 the members discussed methods of increasing the effectiveness of the OAU. Both Mbeki and Obasanjo accepted the invitation to attend the meeting as they considered it an opportunity to advance their foreign policy objectives.

However, Gaddafi's motives for hosting the summit soon became apparent. As Tiekou argues: "It came as a surprise to the 33 African leaders attending the Sirte summit when Gaddafi opened the summit with a presentation of the 'United States of Africa' plan. Equally shocking was his insistence that the plan, which entailed the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single military force, a common African currency, be approved "then and there."^{cxii} Thus, there were now three rival policy interests to consider: those of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya. A compromise was reached by the thirty-three African leaders to overhaul the OAU completely. A constitutive legal document outlining a new continental body for Africa was prepared by the Council of Ministers who submitted it to the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the OAU in Lome in 2000. Fundamentally, it appears that of all the African leaders, Gaddafi, has taken up the Pan-African mantle of Nkrumah.

The motives of the Libyan leader for convening the extraordinary summit are tied not only to political vanity in seeking to take "the credit for the relaunch of continental integration initiative in Africa" but his revived interest in Africa are also linked to wider strategic and geo-political considerations linked to sanctions, and ultimately Gaddafi's objective to maintain in power.^{cxiii} Despite this, it was Gaddafi who resurrected the ideals and vision of Nkrumah in his call for a "United States of Africa" at Sirte. However, the declaration made by the heads of state favoured South Africa's and Nigeria's position of a continental body pushing for economic integration and greater democracy, without calling for a 'United States of Africa.' Reminiscent of Nkrumah's calls for continental union government at the OAU summits of 1964 and 1965, many during this time, as in Sirte, considered Gaddafi's proposal as too radical and over ambitious.^{cxiv} The constitutive text of June 2002, which was approved at the Lome summit, signalled that the African heads of state desired a replacement of the OAU by the AU. None of Gaddafi's ideas were contained in the document. Nevertheless, the decision to replace the OAU was a historic one that eventually led to the inauguration of the AU in Durban on July 9 2002.

At Durban, the Libyan leader was unrelenting and he attended armed with a number of proposed amendments to the Constitutive Act (CA) including a single army for Africa, the need for an AU chairman and greater powers of intervention in member states. Amara Essy was appointed interim Chairman of the AU Commission and in his address he said: "When we mention Kwame Nkrumah, we have summed up in one name the appeal of all our heroes and precursors who, from the embryonic stage of Pan-Africanism to the doors of our present situation, have embodied our thirst for justice and dignity."^{cxv}

Hence, an integral motivating factor in the creation of the AU was as Essy alluded to, the historical Pan-Africanist quest for justice, dignity and greater equality in the world. These were the ideals Nkrumah had remained committed to throughout his life.

In order to create an environment of peace, it seems the leaders of the AU have approved Nkrumah's brainchild in the initiative of an "African Standby Force." This plan bears striking resemblance to Nkrumah's call during the 1960 Congo crisis for an African High Command, which was rejected then and subsequently. Since Nkrumah's death, the idea of a regional versus continental armed force, whose objective would be to enforce peace in various war-torn regions was revived in the early 1970s by the OAU after the November 1970 Portuguese-led attempted invasion of Guinea by the OAU. It was again revived by Nigeria in 1972 at the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in 1977 and 1978.^{cxvi} In the decades of the 1980s and 1990s the proposal has undergone various permutations as civil wars raged in several African countries. As the AU is still in its infancy, the proposal for an African Standby Force has been scheduled to be set up in a phased manner by 2010. Its remit is to provide an effective mechanism for conflict resolution via peacekeeping operations, including military intervention if necessary. Other functions of the force are likely to include humanitarian operations and post-conflict reconstruction.^{cxvii}

At the Fifth Summit of the AU held in Libya in July 2005, Gaddafi once again resurrected the ghost of Nkrumah. He called for a mechanism of defence to oversee the defence and security of the continent that was realistic as opposed to being a paper exercise. He proposed there be a Minister of Defence to implement the AU's joint security and defence charter as stated in Article 3 of the AU's Constitutive Assembly. Gaddafi called for allocating responsibility and accountability for decisions made. He warned against laudable objectives that remained unfulfilled on account of "no official who assumes the job of implementing these policies at the Union level" and at the national level.^{cxviii} He criticised the OAU for achieving little during its forty-year life span and cited Nkrumah's address at the founding of the OAU in 1963. Gaddafi said that in 1963 Nkrumah had predicted that artificial borders would create conflicts and that ordinary Africans desired an improvement in their daily standards of living. He remarked that Nkrumah's words "were brushed aside and Africa paid the price. The average African has paid the price in the form of subjugation to disease, exploitation, backwardness and blackmail."^{cxix} Gaddafi criticized those who considered the idea of a "United States of Africa" as too premature. He claimed: "We have been moving gradually for 100 years."^{cxx} To his fellow heads of states, he proclaimed: "Had we heeded [Nkrumah's] advice at that time, Africa would now be like the United States of America or at least close to it. But we did not heed his advice, and even worse we ridiculed those predictions."^{cxxi} It seems Gaddafi has invoked the language, spirit, ideals and convictions of Nkrumah.

It is far too early to assess the effectiveness of the AU. Nevertheless, the radical transformation of the OAU into the AU appears to have re-ignited Nkrumah's vision of a long-term transformation of the inter-African system into a confederated supranational unit able to reposition itself within an unfolding world context. Without a doubt, Pan-Africanism was what Nkrumah passionately and consistently worked for throughout his life. Whether the AU will achieve the political, economic and social unification of Africa in the decades to come, in order to meet the basic needs of ordinary Africans remains to be seen. However, it is clear that Nkrumah continues to provide the ideological inspiration for a new generation of architects.

Nkrumah's Continuing Relevance

During the 1960s proponents of African unity considered the prospect of various forms of supra-national federations. However, lack of political will and increasing self-interest made the realisation of such perspectives unviable. As Cooper contends, "Nkrumah's hopes for a United States of Africa achieved little support from African leaders intent on protecting the sovereignty they had so strenuously fought for."^{cxix} Yet, there is no political figure on the African continent who waged the struggle for Pan-African unity with such indefatigable energy and sincerity of commitment than Nkrumah. He was the embodiment of a specific historical era in Ghanaian and African history. Moreover, he was a political prophet ahead of his time for many of his pessimistic cautions for the fate of the African continent have borne true.

Thirty-four years since his death, the ideas and issues that Nkrumah lived for and wrote about continue to reverberate across the continent. In his controversial book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* Nkrumah denounced the rampaging nature of multi-national companies, Africa's dependency on aid, debt and increasing poverty in the absence of greater economic and political integration. As Mazrui points out, Nkrumah's book, like Lenin's more famous *Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism*, identified the negative side of globalization.^{cxliii} For Nkrumah, African unity was neither the dream nor fantasy that his detractors and enemies accused him of. He considered African unity as a precondition for the survival of Africa and Africans. In the present era of globalization or unbridled capitalist expansion, it appears that Nkrumah's socio-political and cultural thought continues to have a relevance to a new generation of scholars and African people around the world.

ENDNOTES:

- ⁱ T. Abdul-Raheem, 'The Politics of Burial,' *Thursday Postcard*, 20 October 2005.
- ⁱⁱ A. Mazrui, *Nkrumah's Legacy and Africa's Triple Heritage between Globalization and Counter Terrorism* (Accra, 2004), p. 22.
- ⁱⁱⁱ *Ibid*, p. 45.
- ^{iv} D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (Oxford, 1970); D. Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton, 1972) and 'Ghana' in J. S. Coleman & C. G. Rosberg Jr (eds), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (California, 1970); M. F. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957* (London, 1960).
- ^v There are numerous biographies. Among them are D. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: A Political Kingdom in the Third World* (London, 1988); A. B. Assensoh, *Kwame Nkrumah of Africa: His Formative Years and the Beginning of His Political Career* (London, 1989); B. Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah From Cradle to Grave* (London, 1981); B. Davidson, *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah* (London, 1973); D. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah* (London, 1990); M. Sherwood, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935-1947* (Accra, 1996); J. Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah: A Biography* (London, 1999); Y. Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah* (Moscow, 1987).
- ^{vi} R. Crooks 'Decolonization, the Colonial State and Chieftaincy in the Gold Coast' *African Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 338, 1986, pp.75-105; R. Rathbone, *British Documents in the End of Empire: Ghana* (London, 1992).
- ^{vii} J. Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Wisconsin, 1993); P. Ladouceur, *Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana* (London, 1979); M. Owusu, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana* (Chicago, 1970). R. Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-1960* (London, 2000).
- ^{viii} H. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (London, 1966); T. Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of An African Dictatorship* (London, 1970); J. Kraus, 'Political Change, Conflict and Development in Ghana' in P. Foster and A.R. Zolberg (eds), *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization* (Chicago, 1971), pp.33-72.

^{ix} D. Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy 1950-1990* (London, 1992); T. Killick, *Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana* (London, 1978); R. H. Green, 'Reflections on Economic Strategy, Structure, Implementation, and Necessity: Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1957-67' in P. Foster and A.R. Zolberg (eds) *Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Perspectives on Modernization* (Chicago, 1971), pp.231-264; E. J. Berg 'Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast,' pp. 187-230; R. Genoud, *Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana* (London, 1969).

^x F. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 161.

^{xi} A. Cabral's speech was delivered at the funeral commemoration of Nkrumah in Guinea-Conakry in May 1972, cited in *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral* (New York and London, 1979), p. 115.

^{xii} T. Hodgkin, 'Nkrumah's Radicalism,' *Presence Africaine* (Paris, 1973), p. 63.

^{xiii} *Ibid*, p. 13.

^{xiv} P. Nugent, *Africa Since Independence* (London, 2004), pp.4-5.

^{xv} *Ibid*, p. 8.

^{xvi} C.K. Daddieh, 'Ethnicity, Conflict and the State in Contemporary West Africa' in E.K. Acheampong (ed) *Themes in West Africa's History* (London, 2006), p. 266.

^{xvii} P. Nugent, *Africa Since Independence*, pp.166-167.

^{xviii} C. Young, *Ideology and Development* (London, 1982), p. 1; Nugent, *Africa Since Independence*, pp.166-167.

^{xix} Young, *Ideology and Development*, p. 1.

^{xx} W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, (eds) *African Socialism* (Stanford, 1964).

^{xxi} T. Killick, *Development Economics in Action A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana* (London, 1978).

^{xxii} Green, 'Reflections on Economic Strategy,' in *Development Economics*, pp.231-264.

^{xxiii} W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, (eds) *African Socialism* (Stanford, 1964); see also C. Young, *Ideology and Development*.

^{xxiv} Young, *Ideology and Development*, see chapter 3.

^{xxv} *Ibid*, pp.2-3.

^{xxvi} S. Metz, 'In Lieu of Orthodoxy: The Socialist Theories of Nkrumah and Nyerere,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, 3, 1982, pp.377-392; see also K. Nkrumah, 'African Socialism Revisited' in *The Struggle Continues* (London, 1973), pp. 78-83.

^{xxvii} See J. Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah The Conakry Years His Life and Letters* (London, 1990), p. 94.

^{xxviii} *Ibid*, p. 10.

^{xxix} *Ibid*, p. 10.

^{xxx} See also K. Nkrumah, 'What I Mean by Positive Action' in *Revolutionary Path* (London, 1973), pp.91-95.

^{xxxi} K. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, p. 17.

^{xxxii} *Ibid*, p. 37.

^{xxxiii} K. Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo* (London, 1966) p. xiv.

^{xxxiv} P. Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship* (London, 1970), p.2.

^{xxxv} K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London, 1965), p. 30.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid*, p. 253.

^{xxxvii} K. Nkrumah, *Axioms* (London, 1967), p. 17.

^{xxxviii} Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London, 1963), p. 217.

xxxix Ibid, p. 218.

xl Ibid, p. 219.

xli Ibid, p. 219.

xlii Ibid, p. 220.

xliii Ibid, pp. 220-221.

xliv Ibid, p. 218.

xlv Ibid, pp.221-222.

xlvi Kofi Batsa was editor of the journal entitled *The Spark* during Nkrumah's period in office. He wrote *The Spark From Kwame Nkrumah to Limann* ((London, 1985), p. 30.

xlvii O. Agyeman, *Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations* (US, 1992), p. 79.

xlviii J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: A Selection From Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965* (London, 1967), p. 301.

xlix A declaration of intention to set up the East African Federation between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda had been made on 5 June 1963. It emphasized greater economic co-operation between the three states.

¹ Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p. 303.

li Ibid, p. 302.

lii Ibid, p. 302.

liii Agyeman, *Nkrumah's Ghana* p. 83.

liv Nkrumah, *Revolutionary Path*, p. 288.

lv Ibid, p. 292.

^{lvi} Ahmed Ben Bella was the leader of the Algerian national liberation movement, the FLN. Interview with author on 23 January 1999, Conway Hall, London.

^{lvii} Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 141.

^{lviii} *Ibid*, pp.302 – 309, is the text of Nkrumah's address to the Accra OAU summit.

^{lix} *Ibid*, p. 308.

^{lx} *Ibid*, pp.308-309.

^{lxi} Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 385; see K. Nkrumah, *Rhodesia File* (London, 1976), p. 65.

^{lxii} A. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago, 1985), pp.1-2.

^{lxiii} *Ibid*, p. 2.

^{lxiv} A. Mazrui, *Nkrumah's Legacy and Africa's Triple Heritage Between Globalization and Counter-Terrorism* (Accra, 2004). Other critics are: J. S. Pobee, *Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana: 1949-1966* (Accra, 1970); H. L. Bretton *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa*, (London 1967), P. Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of An African Dictatorship* (London, 1970).

^{lxv} A. Mazrui, *Nkrumah's Legacy*, pp.3-4.

^{lxvi} *Ibid*, p. 4.

^{lxvii} *Ibid*, p. 5. Mazrui makes the point that both Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, who were contemporaries of Nkrumah and Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni, also employed this cultural argument.

^{lxviii} J. F. Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (Longman, 1993); A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (California Press, 2001), C. Young *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (Yale University Press, 1994).

^{lxix} Bayart, *The State in Africa* p. 241.

^{lxx} Ibid, p. 254 and 257.

^{lxxi} A. R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago and London), p. 54.

^{lxxii} Ibid, p. 55.

^{lxxiii} Ibid. p. 44.

^{lxxiv} Ibid, p. 47 – 48.

^{lxxv} Ibid, p. 51.

^{lxxvi} Ibid, p. 55.

^{lxxvii} Ibid, p. 53.

^{lxxviii} Ibid, p. 59.

^{lxxix} Ibid, p. 63.

^{lxxx} Ibid, p. 77.

^{lxxxii} Ibid, p. 79.

^{lxxxii} Ibid, p. 82.

^{lxxxiii} Other African regimes such as that of Milton Obote in Uganda, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania also resorted to legal mechanisms to prevent the emergence of competing political parties.

^{lxxxiv} Zolberg, *Creating Political Order*, p. 82.

^{lxxxv} Ibid, p. 86. In April 1963 eighty-six alleged conspirators were arrested and tried before the Secretary-General of the PDCI who was the prosecutor, and other party officials serving on the bench. Of the total, 22 were acquitted; some were sentenced to long-term imprisonment and 13 received the death penalty.

^{lxxxvi} It is known that Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah took a bet in the late 1950s as to which country would be the economic star of West Africa in a decade or two. In regards to political executions, it is apparent that Houphouet-Boigny won on this political front for in May 1963 Houphouet-Boigny sentenced 13 young members of the RDA to death. See 'Elite Ideologies & the Politics of the Media A Critical History of Ivorien Ideologies & their Press from the Brazzaville Conference to the December 24th 1999 Military Coup' by M. J. Ahipeaud (doctoral thesis, University of London, 2003), p. 155. According to H. M. Basner, the only state execution that took place during Nkrumah's period in power was the execution of the policeman who shot Nkrumah in 1964 and killed his security guard; see Bas/2/91.

^{lxxxvii} F. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 89.

^{lxxxviii} *Ibid*, p. 88.

^{lxxxix} *Ibid*, p. 88.

^{xc} *Ibid*, p. 88.

^{xcii} *Ibid*, p. 88.

^{xcii} O. Agyeman, 'From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26, 2, (1988), p. 374.

^{xciii} D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-1960* (London, 1970).

^{xciv} A. Mazrui, 'Nkrumahism & the Triple Heritage: Out of the Shadows' in F. Falola (ed) *Ghana in Africa & the World: Essays in Honor of Adu Boahen* (Trenton, 2003), p.769.

^{xcv} A. Mazrui, *Nkrumah's Legacy*, p. 3.

^{xcvi} Cited in T. Abdul-Raheem, *Pan-Africanism Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty First Century* (London, 1996), p. 7. See also B. Sutherland & M. Meyer, *Guns & Gandhi in Africa Pan-African Insights on Non-Violence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa* (New Jersey, 2000), pp.216-223.

^{xcvii} J. Nyerere Opening Speech to Sixth PAC, in *Resolutions & Selected Speeches: The Sixth Pan-African Congress* (Dar es Salaam, 1976), p. 4. See also Sutherland & Meyer, *Guns & Gandhi*, p. 219.

^{xcviii} Ibid, p. 5.

^{xcix} Ibid, p. 5. The address given by President Sekou Toure also critically addressed class issues in the struggle for Pan-Africanism; see *Resolutions & Selected Speeches*, 11-17.

^c K. Nkrumah, *The Struggle Continues* (London, 1973), pp.36-45.

^{ci} *Resolutions & Selected Speeches*, p.8.

^{cii} Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 58.

^{ciii} Sutherland & Meyer, *Guns & Gandhi*, p. 22.

^{civ} See the introduction by Abdul-Raheem, *Pan-Africanism* pp.1-25.

^{cv} Ibid, p. 14.

^{cvi} *Africa at 40*. Vol.1.No.3 April 1997, p. 4.

^{cvi} Ibid, p. 4.

^{cvi} Ibid, p. 4.

^{cix} Nkrumah, *Handbook*, p. 36.

^{cx} I. Tiekou, 'Explaining the Clash & Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union,' *African Affairs* 103 (2004), p. 252.

^{cx} Ibid, pp.249-267.

^{cxii} Ibid, p. 261.

^{cxiii} Ibid. p. 261.

^{cxiv} Tiekou, 'Explaining the Clash,' p. 262.

^{cxv} P. Commey 'African Union What Next?' *New African* September 1992, pp.12-15.

^{cxvi} T. A. Imobighe, 'African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Defence' *African Affairs* (1980), No.315. 79, pp.241-254.

^{cxvii} P. Commey 'African Union So Far,' p.12-15.

^{cxviii} See abridged version of Gaddafi's address to the AU summit, 4-6 July 2005 in *New African* August/September 2005, pp. 30-33.

^{cxix} *Ibid.* p. 32.

^{cxx} *Ibid.* p. 33.

^{cxxi} *Ibid.*, p. 32.

^{cxxii} Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, p. 183.

^{cxxiii} Mazrui, *Nkrumah's Legacy*, p. 2.